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An abstract of the thesis of Dorothy Jean Frew for the Master 
of Arts in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages 
presented November 18, 1994. 
Title: An Improved English Article System for Japanese 
Speakers. 
One aspect of the English language which has been 
overlooked by English-as-a-Second-Language educators is the 
article system, ,::;,, tlJe,, and 0. For students from article-
less first languages such as Japanese, learning this complex 
system is a formidable challenge. Performance studies show 
an error rate among advanced Japanese students of 
approximately thirty percent. There may be several reasons 
for this high rate: 1) the differences between Japanese and 
English, 2) the unusually high degree of 
complexity/difficulty of the article system itself compared 
to other English morpheme systems and 3) inadequate 
treatments of the subject as revealed in this thesis' survey 
of forty ESL textbooks. 
11 
Recent pragmatic discoveries about article function 
' 
reveal subtle, contextual influences which have not been well 
integrated into traditional treatments. Definiteness may be 
dependent on sentential, discourse, and situational contexts, 
on whether referents are unique and manifest to the hearer, 
and on the nature of certain implicatures induced by the 
articles. Computerized, interactive tutorials are 
the best way to capture how these variables interact to 
constrain article choice. 
A prototype for a tutorial is submitted with this 
thesis. In addition to exhaustive explanations of contexts 
and implicatures in the form of actor's "asides," it features 
Japanese translations throughout, and, to show how uniqueness 
may be culture bound, utterances that take place within 
Japanese culture. Although the tutorial presented here needs 
enlargement, it is believed that an animated, computerized 
tutorial emphasizing subtle pragmatic features is more 
illustrative of actual article usage than have been 
traditional hard copy explanations. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis presents suggestions for an intensive 
computerized tutorial on the English article system for 
Japanese speakers. Rational for the tutorial is provided by 
a high article error rate among advanced Japanese students, 
by acquisition research supporting a high degree of 
complexity of the article system, and by an underestimation 
of the problem by English-speaking educators. A survey of 
forty English-as-a-Second-Language (ESL) textbooks shows a 
deficiency in this area. 
An examination of scholarly (i.e.,philosophical and 
linguistic) discussions reveals pragmatic insights that have 
not been well integrated into ESL materials. One such 
insight is that article choice is dependent on sentential, 
discourse, and situational contexts, and the extent to which 
these contexts are manifest to speaker and hearer. The 
present work argues that this kind of contextual information 
is awkward for traditional, hard copy textbooks to capture 
and demonstrate. Animated, interactive, computerized 
tutorials have the advantage of offering visually dynamic 
context. 
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Part of this project consists of a design for such a 
tutorial. The materials illustrate how noun phrases are made 
definite by four possible pragmatic 11 sets 11 (i.e. contexts 
wider than a sentence) which inform hearer knowledge: 1) 
physical setting [of the utterance] set; 2) "linguistic" 
community set; 3) set resulting from bridging; and, 4) 
previous discourse set. Within a pragmatic set, certain 
linguistic structures may help to delimit the set of shared 
objects, namely, genitives, prepositional phrases, and 
restrictive relative clauses, and these too are illustrated 
in the materials. The materials also demonstrate how 
variability in interpretation of the article a derives from 
implicatures activated by a and by whether or not the could 
have been used instead. This idea is a direct application 
of John Hawkins' 1991 implicature theory for the articles. 
An important aspect of the materials is that the 
examples, though in English, are partly situated in Japanese 
culture. Since mutual knowledge is key to usage, and since 
so much of that knowledge is culture-bound, using only 
American cultural settings would undermine understanding in 
certain cases. In fact, in the Japan-specific cases it 
should be impossible in this tutorial for American users to 
choose the correct article. 
The design of this tutorial is unique in several ways. 
It gives intensive treatment to an area usually considered 
trivial; it incorporates recently discovered pragmatic 
~ 
information into its explanations, and it goes against 
current popular trends by making explanations available in 
the first language. Most importantly, it situates many 
examples within Japanese culture. It is claimed that the 
tutorial will benefit students by increasing their 
understanding of the systematicity behind correct article 
choice; it is not claimed, however, that this understanding 
will necessarily improve students' article proficiency. 
3 
Chapter I illustrates the communication breakdowns that 
article errors cause and touches on three possible sources 
of the learning problem: 1) the differences between Japanese 
and English 2) the complexity of the article system and 3) 
the dearth of adequate instructional materials. 
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CHAPTER II 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
DO ERRORS REALLY MATTER? 
Perhaps one reason educators have paid little attention 
to the articles is that article errors are to some extent 
invisible. In certain contexts, mistakes are not noticeable 
because either the definite article or the indefinite 
article sounds correct on the surface. Even though the only 
correct choice is the article which reflects the speaker's 
intended meaning, either article may seem correct to a 
listener because either meaning is possible in a given 
context. Since listeners assume that speakers mean what 
they say, listeners cannot detect such errors. For example, 
I was disappointed in my grade, so I talked to a/the teacher 
about it. She told me that a Bis respectable, so now I 
feel better. 
A and the have different referents, but because either 
referent is compatible with the context, a listener would 
have no reason to doubt a speaker's wrong choice, and the 
error would go unnoticed. 
At other times, when errors are noticeable they seem 
slight because the speaker's intended meaning remains 
nonetheless clear. For example, for any NP that has 
inherent uniqueness (tallest building, Queen of England) 
the obligatory use of the, signalling uniqueness, is 
redundant. Thus, when a speaker omits the by mistake, the 
uniqueness of the referent stays intact. In *We visited 
tallest building in Chicago, the omission of the sounds 
foreign but does not damage meaning. In other unambiguous 
contexts, damage to meaning is slight even though 0 is 
mistakenly supplied. 
* We went to coast, but water was too cold for bathing. 
* I live in apartment, not Ondine. 
* What is meaning of hunch? 
These examples give the impression that articles don't count 
for much in actual communication. However, other examples 
show they do count. The poetry of the following passage 
from a student paper is tainted by article errors: 
Underneath the document he has a a picture by Sargent, the 
painting of Venice in watercolor. When he is tired, he 
stares at the painting secretly. Whenever he takes £ tiny 
postcard with the painting out of his desk, no one notices. 
Its transparency washes out his stress. He feels 
comfortable, even in his cold, hard chair. He feels as 
though a light has been lit in his body. The light flicks 
on like £ tiny fire of a match, and then glows. It happens 
in a brief second (Nakai 1994). 
The following utterances cause communication breakdowns: 
5 
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* I was disappointed in my grade, so I talked to the teacher 
about it. She told me to speak to my teacher. 
* I went to the class, but there were not enough chairs, so 
a student carried the chairs in. 
(two strangers in a dormitory cafeteria) 
Japanese: *I also live in dormitory. 
American: Oh, on the third floor, too? 
Japanese: No, fourth floor. 
American: Fourth floor? I didn't know there was a fourth floor. 
Japanese: Of course. 
American: I thought just the roof was above me. 
Japanese: Yes, just the roof. 
American: So you live on the roof? 
Japanese: Excuse me? 
On hearing the unacceptable versions, a listener can make 
mental repairs, can request clarification, or can remain 
politely confused. But even listeners who see no real harm 
in such errors eventually find a series of them mentally 
draining. Worse, speakers who know they make these errors 
at every turn fear they can never be correct or accurate. 
Empirical research shows that the problem is severe 
among Japanese students. Yamada and Matsuura (1982) studied 
an advanced group of thirty-five students at Hiroshima 
University who expected to become high school teachers of 
English after graduation. The students were found to have an 
article error rate of 30 percent in their writing. Since 
7 
there are three types of articles, a, the, and 0, if a 
student were to use them at random, the probability of 
accuracy would be 33.3 percent. The 30 percent error rate of 
the Hiroshima students is the same as a 70 percent accuracy 
rate, or, 36.7 percentage points better than random usage. 
Considering the frequency of articles in English (roughly 
every tenth word is an article), the students' 30 percent 
error rate means that in a 1,000 word essay approximately 
100 words would be articles, and 30 of those would be 
errors, or roughly 10 errors per page. 
How important are articles to native speakers? One 
requirement for the definite article is that the noun be 
mutually known to speaker and hearer. Among other things, 
mutual knowledge may be based on community membership. 
Members of the same "linguistic" community may refer to the 
courthouse, the deli, the river, etc., but community also 
extends to any group that conjoins the knowledge bases of 
speaker and hearer. Clark and Marshall (1981) claim that 
articles are so important to English communication that "In 
ordinary conversation people go to some trouble to establish 
the communities of which they are members just so that their 
definite references will succeed" (p.36). This claim is 
illustrated in Schegloff's (1972) study of how people 
formulate their references to places, as when giving or 
receiving directions. For example, near a university a 
visitor would look for someone who looked like a student 
(had student membership) to ask, "Would you know where the 
student union is? Where Shattuck Hall is?" 
Articles are important to English speakers in every 
type of media. Speakers may tolerate omissions in telegrams 
and newspaper headlines because the confusion that results 
is short-lived. But in extended speech or in text, frequent 
omissions burden the hearer's decoding process. Articles 
serve the purpose of clarity by providing hearers with 
satisfactory references. For this reason, article-less text 
is not a desired effect in machine translation. For 
example, in the Knowledge-Based Machine Translation Project 
(KBMT-89), devices have been built to incorporate articles 
into the machine-translated English output from Japanese 
text. According to Goodman and Nirenburg (1991), "The 
KBMT-89 mapping rules pick up the feature ref with values 
definite or indefinite and transmit it to the ILT 
[interlingua text] [because] information about definiteness 
provides important semantic information about a sentence" 
(p.83). 
Part of the problem with the articles is that English-
speaking educators have not realized that there is a 
problem. Being accustomed to using the same three small 
words so often, they tend to trivialize what the words mean 
and take usage for granted. Also, errors are often 
overlooked in the natural effort to listen for message 
rather than correctness of form. In everyday conversations, 
.;l. 
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where a misunderstanding can be quickly repaired, English 
speakers hardly notice article errors and remain unaware of 
a speaker's anxiety. But article errors in text bring the 
reading process to a halt, aggravate the reader and, in the 
case of schoolwork, often result in a lower grade. One 
group that has not taken either speaking or writing of the 
articles for granted is the Japanese. They experience 
frustration in both modes, frustration that needs to be 
taken seriously. The next section will discuss some 
differences between Japanese and English that could partly 
account for the difficulty Japanese speakers experience in 
trying to master the English article system. 
9 
THE LEARNING PROBLEM 
Some Differences Between English and Japanese 
The use of the definite article is often a source 
of extreme frustration for the foreign learner of 
English, particularly if his native language does 
not exhibit some overt means of expressing that 
which the definite article in English expresses. 
(Grannis 1972, p. 275) 
Since Japanese is an article-less language, some 
believe that the concept of definiteness is foreign to 
Japanese speakers, a notion which Kubo (1988) and Tawa 
10 
(1993) dispute. According to Kubo, "a definite NP refers to 
an entity that is in some sense given in the conversational 
common ground, whereas an indefinite NP refers to an entity 
that is newly added to the conversational domain." (p. 22) 
Both linguists maintain that Japanese speakers infer the 
definiteness status of noun phrases (NPs) and null-NPs (also 
called empty nouns, empty pronominals or zero anaphora), 
without relying on articles. Tawa illustrates her argument 
about null-NPs by the following example: 
Ji tegamij-O kakimashita ka? 
letter-ACC wrote Q (ACC=accusative,Q=interrogative) 
Did [youJi write the letterj? 
ee kinoo Ji J j kakimashi ta. 
Yes yesterday f l f l wrote 
Yes, [Ili wrote [it]j yesterday (p. 380). 
In Japanese, the full noun phrase letter becomes the null-
NP [ ]j because the speaker assumes that the hearer is able 
11 
to identify the referent, whereas in English the hearer 
would expect the pronoun it. Kubo claims that because all 
null-NPs are anaphoric, they are inherently definite. (In 
English, anaphora occurs when the +definite NP refers back 
to a ±definite NP previously mentioned in discourse) . But 
Tawa argues that being anaphoric does not necessarily entail 
being definite. She shows how, depending on the referent, 
null-NPs can be interpreted as definite, indefinite or 
nondefinite (see Figure 1.). Nondefinite interpretations 
are those which allow only the most generalized, abstract 
knowledge of an object. She writes, " ... nondefinites denote 
uninstantiated schemata, while definites and indefinites are 
instantiated forms of schemata with definites having more 
specifications than indefinites" (p. 383). A null-NP is 
interpreted as nondefinite when it refers back to a 
nondefinite full-NP. Her example, translated from a 
Japanese novel, is Does pain go away and leave no trace, 
12 





• ... a boy 
comes by riding a 
bicycle .. .. And he sees 
the pears ... (example 
from Du Bois, 1980) 
•I bought a book by 
Tolstoy. But before I 
read it my brother tore 




•I saw a friend in town. 




•I am thinking of buying 
two apples today. 
•I want to marry a rich 
man. 
•I'd like to buy an 
interesting book. 
•It would be nice to have 
children. Would you like 
it if we adopted a child? 
Nondefinite 
•Does pain go away and 
leave no trace, then? 
You sometimes even 
feel sentimental for it. 
•Books are good for 
children, but they can 
be expensive. 
•He looks like a 
uh. .. Chicano American 
(example from Du Bois, 
1980) 
•Mary is a forester. 
She's been a forester 
for three years now. [Du 
Bois, 1980] 
• 
Can you swim a mile? 
When you can swim a 
mile you'll be ready for 
the trip. [Du Bois, 1980] 
Figure 1. Tawa's description of definiteess in Japanese. 
then? You sometimes even feel sentimental for it. The 
Japanese null-NP that would stand in for it would carry a 
nondef inite interpretation because the referent pain is 
used in the general, abstract sense not in an instantiated 
sense. 
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Definite and indefinite interpretations must first 
attend to the referentiality of the referent, which must be 
either referential or nonreferential. These terms are not 
clearly defined by Tawa, but borrowing a definition from Du 
Bois (1980), she says that an NP is used referentially when 
it speaks "about an object as an object with continuous 
identity over time." Nonreferential NPs are "not used to 
speak about an object as an object" (p. 390). When the 
referent is both referential and "known" to the hearer, the 
null-NP is interpreted as definite; but when the referential 
referent is not known to the hearer, the null-NP is 
interpreted as indefinite. If the referent is nonreferential 
and not nondefinite, the null-NP is also interpreted as 
indefinite. An example of a nonreferential indefinite would 
be I want to marry a rich man. Here, the nonreferrential 
object a rich man is indefinite as opposed to nondefinite 
because it represents an instantiation of the abstract 
concept man. Presumably, if the instantiation were further 
specified so as to be referential and known to the listener, 
then it would receive a definite interpretation: I want to 
marry the rich man sitting at that table. 
14 
One student's error in the Iwasaki (1990) study 
reflected the Japanese concept of nondefiniteness. The 
student wrote " ... when I was high school student ... " 
Iwasaki illuminated the error in terms of first-language 
(Japanese) perception. A predicate nominal like student 
"functions as a tool of categorization or description of 
attribution" (p.85). This function sounds similar to the 
nondefinite schema described in Tawa. Because high school 
student is not an instantiation of student, the subject 
might think of this NP as nonreferential nondefinite in 
Tawa's sense, similar to Mary is a forester. But, as shown 
in the examples, Mary is a forester and Does pain go 
away ... , nondefinites in Japanese can be expressed with 0 
or a in English. Apparently, the student was unable to 
make the correct choice at this point. The examples in 
Figure 1., taken from Tawa, show how definiteness status in 
Japanese can be variously translated into the English 
article system. 
Although Kubo and Tawa disagree about the exact status 
of null-NPs, they agree that Japanese hearers infer 
definiteness status via their perception of the noun, as 
informed by the context of the discourse. Though not 
formally encoded, definiteness status is tacitly conveyed 
and understood in Japanese. 
Yet, it is clear that when definiteness status requires 
formal encoding, as it does in English, problems arise for 
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the Japanese speaker. The examples in Figure 1. show that 
one source of difficulty may reside in the terminological 
confusion caused by the words definite and indefinite and 
what notions each controls in the two languages. (Other 
terms may have similar problems: specified, classified, 
known, unique, particular, familiar, which, reference, and 
identified) For example, Tawa's sense of definite could 
allow for either a or the in English. This sense is not 
at odds with how the term is used in some scholarly grammars 
of English but is at odds with many applied grammars and 
teaching grammars, wherein definite meanings are said to be 
rendered with the only (and indefinite meanings are said to 
be rendered with a only). Thus, the distinction between 
the definite and indefinite effects to which a noun is 
subject in Japanese may not correspond to the distinction 
said to be expressed by the choice of the article in 
English, and this noncorrespondence could be troublesome for 
students. 
Beyond terminological mix-ups, Iwasaki speculates on a 
more serious problem. While students may grasp that a 
+definite NP requires both "specificity" (referentiality?) 
and hearer knowledge, the same general features it conveys 
in Japanese, students may wonder at what point these two 
criteria have been sufficiently met in English to warrant 
the definite article. That is to say, to make native-like 
judgements students may need a finely tuned understanding of 
16 
the heuristics that appraise specificity and hearer 
knowledge, since informal definitions may be too vague. 
This need is implied by Yamada and Matsuura (1982): 
" ... [students] cannot use articles correctly simply because 
they cannot identify given items by means of 
[specific/nonspecific] ... , semantic notions" (p.51). And 
Iwasaki cites two Japanese writers, Oda (1990) and Koizumi 
(1990), who agree with her that "Japanese students [when 
speaking Japanese] lack the need to express overtly concepts 
related to articles such as specificity and definiteness" 
(p.22). These authors believe that it is the switch from 
implied definiteness to overt definiteness that constitutes 
the interference hurdle from Japanese to English. 
This hurdle also predicted by the Markedness 
Differential Hypothesis (Eckman 1977). This hypothesis 
predicts that areas of the target language which differ from 
the native language and are more marked than the native 
language will be difficult; whereas, areas of the target 
language which differ from the native language, but are not 
more marked than the native language will not be difficult.I 
In the case of articles, the Markedness Differential 
Hypothesis predicts that, being marked, the articles will be 
1 Eckman's definition of markedness: "A phenomenon A in some language is more marked than B if the 
presence of A in a language implies the presence of B; but the presence of B does not imply the presence 
of A." There are languages with both ±definite and 0 articles (French, English), and there are languages 
that have no articles at all (Chinese and Japanese), but there are no languages that have ±definite articles 
without also having 0 articles; therefore, the presence of articles implies the presence of 0 before nouns, 
but the presence of 0 before nouns does not imply the presence of articles. Therefore, articles would be 
considered more marked than no articles. 
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difficult for Japanese speakers to acquire; but that, being 
unmarked, the article-less NPs and null-NPs of Japanese will 
not be difficult for English speakers to omit. As to the 
latter, teachers of Japanese report that their English-
speaking students deploy article-less NPs and null-NPs with 
ease (J. Moore 1994, personal communication, August 10, 
1994). 
Empirical research supports the prediction of the 
Markedness Differential Hypothesis. Several performance 
analysis studies (Iwasaki 1990; Thomas, M.1989; Parrish 
1987; Yamada and Matsuura 1982; Master 1987) report that 
Japanese speakers overuse the 0 article, transferring the 
form from Japanese. The same tendency is not found in 
studies of language groups that do have articles. The 
overuse of 0 (at rates of 47% in the Iwasaki study and 57% 
in the Yamada and Matsuura study) corroborates the widely 
held view that the Japanese have difficulty expressing 
definiteness overtly. 
Another difference between the two languages is that 
Japanese, unlike English, does not categorize nouns into 
±count and ±singular. All nouns in Japanese are mass (that 
is, -count), and any noun not marked for number (by a 
numeral classifier such as three volumes of book, three 
pages of book) may be construed as either singular or 
plural (Gil 1987). Since these categorical distinctions are 
not relevant to the Japanese perception of nouns, yet are 
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crucial to the English perception, this difference can slow 
fluency and discourage acquisition. 
One of the most important and overlooked differences 
between Japanese and English is the cultural component of 
article usage. Many instances of uniqueness/nonuniqueness 
are culture-bound. For example, in order to produce the 
correct article in the sentence on which day of the year 
does the sun set on the heelstone? a student would need to 
know that Stonehenge had a unique stone called the 
"heelstone." Without this vital piece of information, it 
would be impossible to know whether a heelstone or the 
heelstone was correct. Similarly, even though an apartment 
complex may have one hundred units, an American would say 
the/a* roof is leaking because the culture conceives of 
buildings as having just one roof no matter how large or 
angled or how many households it shelters. Nothing other 
than the speaker's cultural heritage informs this use of 
the. More subtle examples of culture-specific uniqueness 
are provided by Pica's (1983) research. In higher priced 
restaurants she found that customers used the more of ten 
(I'll have the tuna melt with chips) because they perceived 
their orders as unique, i.e., specially placed with the cook 
and not existing until the order was placed. But in fast 
food restaurants the use of a was more common ( ... a Big 
Mac and a large fries) because customers perceived their 
orders as typical and probably in a group of similar, 
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already-prepared orders. These are cultural-specific cases 
of uniqueness. Japanese speakers cannot be expected to know 
the perceptual habits of English-speaking cultures. The 
important point is that parties to the educational process 
be aware of the cultural component and attribute usage to 
that component when appropriate. 
This paper will attempt to remedy the problem of 
article usage for Japanese students only, although the 
problem is common to all groups whose languages are article-
less such as Chinese, Korean, Russian, Czech, and African 
languages such as Bantu. Several comparative studies have 
shown (Oller and Redding 1971; Kempf 1975; Ringbom 
1976;Dulay and Burt 1974; Fathman 1977;Zobl 1982; Gilbert 
1983) that these groups use English articles with greater 
difficulty than speakers whose languages do have articles 
(or article-like morphemes) such as French, Spanish, 
Persian, Arabic and Hebrew. 
Complexity of the Article System 
Apart from first-language transfer, another possible 
reason why the articles are difficult for Japanese speakers 
to master is that within English grammar as a whole, the 
article system is unusually complicated. Recognizing this 
fact, applied linguists often remark that articles seem 
difficult in spite of their frequency of occurrence in 
20 
native-speaker input2. They suggest that structures with 
high frequency and high difficulty may be more "complex" 
than other structures (those with low frequency and high 
difficulty, low frequency and low difficulty, or high 
frequency and low difficulty) . 
In 1973, Roger Brown conducted a three-year 
longitudinal study of the language acquisition of three 
English-speaking toddlers. He found that all three 
children, regardless of individual learning environment, 
acquired particular morphemes of English in the same 
sequential order. Brown correlated this "natural" order to 
increasing semantic complexity of the morphemes, and he 
highlighted the complexity of the article system in 
particular, providing empirical evidence in support of 
linguists' intuitions that the article system was an 
unusually difficult system to master. 
At that time, other researchers were looking at the 
morpheme acquisition of non-native English learners and 
finding a different "natural" order. They attributed this 
order not to increasing semantic complexity but to 
decreasing frequency in the input. More exposures to a 
morpheme (in ambient speech) equalled speedier acquisition, 
while fewer exposures equalled slower acquisition. They 
2 According to Carroll, Davies, and Richman the is by far the most frequent word across all disciplines, 
a is ranked fourth in frequency and an is ranked thirty-ninth. Adding the adjusted frequencies per million 
words of these three articles yields a combined frequency of very close to 100,000 per 1,000,000 words. 
Put another way, approximatly one word in ten is the, a, or an. To the extent that obligatory 0 was not 
counted, we can assume that their estimate is conservative for article usage. 
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found highest frequency for the articles and also a higher 
ranking for the articles than Brown had found. However, 
close examination of the L23 methodology shows that the 
articles ranked as they had in Brown's Ll study, and that 
therefore, the L2 findings did not contradict Brown's 
observation that the articles were highly complex. 
Brown's data ranked articles as eighth to be acquired 
out of fourteen morphemes studied.4 As to their frequency 
of occurrence in parental speech, he observed that all three 
sets of parents used articles more often than other 
morphemes.5 Comparing all the frequencies to rank orders, 
Brown concluded that there was no evidence that parental 
frequencies influenced the order of acquisition. Greater 
frequency did not predict speedier acquisition and less 
frequency did not predict slower acquisition. 
The next obvious variable that might explain why 
children needed more exposures to some morphemes only to 
acquire them relatively late (or the converse) would be the 
semantic complexity of the morphemes. After separating the 
fourteen morphemes into pairs whose members had identical 
semantic meanings (such as the contractible and 
3 L2 means second language; L 1 means first language. 
4 The fourteen morphemes in Brown's survey, in order of acquisition, were:1) Present progressive, 2.5) 
in 2.5) on 4) Plural 5) Past irregular 6) Possessive 7) Uncontractible copula 8) Articles 9) Past regular 10) 
Third person regular 11) Third person irregular 12) Uncontractible auxiliary 13) Contractible copula 14) 
Contractible auxiliary. 
5 The parents used articles 552 times. Their next most frequently used morpheme was the thirteenth, 
390 times, then 175 times for the seventh morpheme. 
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uncontractible copula, I am, I'm) and non-pairs that had 
unitary meanings (such as the possessive), Brown discovered 
that, indeed, increasing semantic complexity could explain 
the general order of the morphemes. Out of all the non-
pairs, the articles placed last in order of acquisition. 
Brown concluded, "It is my impression that [the] specific-
nonspecific [meaning] is the most complex of these, in some 
sense or other, and so perhaps the fact that it is the last 
of the meanings to be acquired is an indication that 
semantic complexity is a determinant of acquisition order" 
(p.369). 
In the 1970s, morpheme studies were also performed on 
non-native speakers learning English as a second language. 
Several of these (Dulay and Burt 1973; Dulay and Burt 1974; 
Bailey, Madden and Krashen 1974; Larsen-Freeman 1975) 
discovered sequences that differed from Brown's Ll study yet 
"correlated statistically" to one another, indicating that 
semantico-syntactic complexity would not suffice to explain 
the morpheme orders of L2 learners. To explain these orders, 
Larsen-Freeman (1976) reintroduced the frequency hypothesis 
which Brown had rejected. 
Larsen-Freeman found that significant correlations 
existed when she re-examined the speaking task data of her 
1975 study and compared it to the frequencies of the 
obligatory contexts produced by the subjects themselves (on 
the theory that the counts reflect their actual occurrence 
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in real communication). Using Spearman's rank-order 
correlational analysis, Larsen-Freeman also found 
significant positive correlations between the frequency 
input orders from the parents in Brown's study and the 
morpheme orders in Dulay and Burt 1974 and in Bailey et al., 
1974. Tentatively, she concluded that "morpheme frequency 
in native-speaker speech is the principle determinant for 
oral production of morpheme order of second language 
learners" (p.132). Her conclusion contradicted educators' 
intuitions about articles as well as Brown's findings for 
the morpheme order of Ll speakers. 
However, a close look at just the articles, separated 
from the other morphemes, revealed that the educators' 
intuitions and Brown's findings remained valid for the 
articles, Larsen-Freeman's general conclusion 
notwithstanding. 
To begin with, Larsen-Freeman considered the ten 
morphemes of her 1975 study as two large groups--a high 
ranking group (acquired first) and a low-ranking group 
(acquired last). She then counted the number of obligatory 
contexts and found them to be generally higher for the top 
group and generally lower for the bottom group, thus 
supportive of rank to frequency correspondence. But within 
the high-ranking group the articles ranked last yet had the 
highest number of obligatory contexts of any morpheme in the 
entire study, 825 in all, while the three higher ranking 
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morphemes had far fewer obligatory contexts: copula, 224; 
progressive, 326; auxiliary, 276. Her analysis obscured the 
special case of the articles, which displayed the familiar 
pattern of very high frequency and low relative rank 
demonstrated in the Brown study. In a subsequent survey 
Larsen-Freeman and Long (1991) commented that the Japanese 
subgroup in the Larsen-Freeman 1975 study had indicated 
especially low rank for the articles, supporting the 
previously described difficulties of language groups which 
do not express definiteness overtly. 
The Bailey et al., 1974 study, which was also used to 
support the frequency hypothesis, nevertheless ranked the 
articles fourth in a cross-comparison of just the morphemes 
studied by all researchers (see Table I). Moreover, when 
their non-Spanish group, which included Japanese and Chinese 
speakers, was examined alone, the articles dropped to sixth 
place. Although Larsen-Freeman did not include the Dulay 
and Burt 1973 results in her frequency study, their article 
ranking was also similar to that of Brown and the others. 
The evidence suggested that the supposed lack of effect for 
semantic complexity and positive effect for frequency was 
refuted for the article category. And as expected, the Ll 
article-less subgroups showed especially low rank for the 
articles. 
TABLE I 
FIRST- AND SECOND-LANGUAGE MORPHEME STUDIES 
Brown Burt & Dulay Burt & Dulay Bailey, Madden Bailey ,Madden Larsen-Freeman 
1973 1973 1974 Krashen Krashen 1975 
longitudinal; BSM expanded BSM 1974 1974 Speaking Task 
Rank spontaneous BSM BSM 
speech 
3 English-speaking 151 Spanish- Spanish and 73 adults 73 adults 24 adults in 
children speaking children Chinese-speaking various languages various languages beginnning ESL; 
ages 18mos- ages 5-8 children six each of 
25mos ages 6-8 (Non-Spanish Arabic 
group only) Japanese 
Persian 
Spanish 
14 morphemes 8 morphemes 11 morphemes 8 morphemes 8 morphemes 1 O morphemes 
1 1.Progressive 1.Plural 2.ARTICLES 1 . Progressive 1.Progressive 1.Contr Cop 
2 4.Plural 2. Progressive 3. Progressive 2.Plural 2.Contr Cop 2. Progressive 
3 5.Past lrreg 3.Contr Cop 4.Contr Cop 3.Contr Cop 3.Past lrreg 3.Contr Aux 
4 6. Possessive 4.Contr Aux 5.Plural 4.ARTICLES 4.Plural 4.ARTICLES 
5 8.ARTICLES 5.ARTICLES 6.Contr Aux 5.Past lrreg 5.Contr Aux 5.Plural 
6 10.3rd Pers Reg 6.Past lrreg 8. Past lrreg 6. Possessive 6.ARTICLES 6. Possessive 
7 13.Contr Cop 7.3rd Pers Req 1 O. Possessive 7.Contr Aux 7 .3rd Pers Reg 7.Past lrreq 
8 14.Contr Aux 8. Possessive 11.3rd Pers Reg 8.3rd Pers Reg 8. Possessive 8.3rd Pers Reg 
This table shows the ranks of the articles when only the morphemes studied by 
all researchers are compared. The number inunediately preceding each morpheme 
indicates that morpheme's rank in its original study. N 
Ul 
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One outstanding exception was the Dulay and Burt 1974 
study of Spanish and Chinese-speaking children, which 
claimed a very high rank for the articles for both language 
groups. This high rank, especially for the Chinese group, 
seemed suspicious in light of the many comparative studies 
which contradicted it, studies which showed that speakers 
from article-less languages such as Chinese use English 
articles with greater difficulty than speakers whose 
languages do have articles such as Spanish (Oller and 
Redding 1971; Kempf 1975; Ringbom 1976;Dulay and Burt 1974; 
Fat:b..r~an 1977;Zobl 1982; Gilbert 1983). For example, in a 
similar study by Fathman (1975) using sixty Korean and sixty 
Spanish-speaking children aged six to fourteen, the only 
area that displayed a significant difference between the two 
groups was the article~. Since the Dulay and Burt 1974 
accuracy rate was inconsistent with many other studies on 
article-less language groups, its results seem unreliable.6 
The ESL subjects, who were older than Brown's 
subjects, but like the Brown subjects, had received more 
exposures to the articles than to any other forms, achieved 
a relative proficiency rate for the articles no more easily 
61t is hard to guess at the possible methodological causes for the outcome in the Dulay and Burt 1974 
study without seeing the raw data. However, the result could be a function of the Bilingual Syntax 
Measure (BSM), the test which elicits responses to fixed questions about cartoon pictures. Whereas in 
the Brown study the children's spontaneous interactions with their parents uncovered faulty usages such 
as the following: Adam:And that the bowl. Mother: What Bowl? (the child incorrectly used the definite 
article in reference to a bowl unknown to the hearer, his mother), in the BSM, children could overuse the 
without penalty because the shared knowledge of the cartoon picture would absorb all uses of the yet 
would also allow a whenever the children saw themselves as informants to the interviewer, introducing 
new information. The ambiguity allowed by the task may have artificially raised the accuracy rates of a 
and the. This generosity of the measuring instrument might account for an abnormally high accuracy rate 
in the Dulay and Burt 1974 study. 
than Brown's native learners. This finding seemed to 
indicate that complexity remained a key consideration in 
explaining the relative delay/difficulty in acquisition of 
the article system. And in fact, Larsen-Freeman and Long, 
after reviewing other studies that also supported a 
frequency effect, conceded that: 
Despite these generally encouraging findings, a 
few qualifications are in order. First, advocates 
of a frequency explanation have to account for the 
fact that articles, which are always by far the 
most frequent item in (ESL) input, are relatively 
late acquired, and, like other items in accuracy 
orders, clearly subject to Ll influence (Larsen-
Freeman and Long 1991, p. 134). 
Even when not considering frequency rates at all, 
specialists in ESL share Roger Brown's impression that the 
articles have " ... the greatest semantic complexity of the 
lot" (p.356). They observe that contrasts among the 
articles are determined by an unusually high number of 
features (of the noun phrase): count-mass, singular-plural, 
four possible points of view between the speaker and 
hearer, and the effects of four possible implicatures.7 
Juggling this amount of complexity on-line would seem to 
account for the difficulty if not impossibility of using 
articles proficiently, especially on a conscious level. To 
the extent that non-native speakers acquire English more 
consciously than English-speaking children, complexity as 
defined by the number of grammatical/semantic features, 
7 Seepage 59 
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would seem to belabor L2 acquisition. Exactly what this 
"complexity" consists of will be the subject of Chapter III. 
The complexity of the article system coupled with 
teaching materials inadequate to the task, have led 
students, teachers, and applied linguists to conclude that 
the English article system is one of most difficult systems 
to teach/learn. (Larsen-Freeman and Long 1991; Iwasaki 1990; 
Master 1990; Thompson 1987; Pica 1983; Yamada and Matsuura 
1982; Molhot 1980; Lacey 1977; Covitt 1976; Maratsos 1976; 
Whitman 1974; Grannis 1972). 
The Dearth of Adequate Instructional Materials 
Surprisingly little material exists for teaching 
plurals and articles. It is a difficult area, and 
perhaps a tedious one, but many Japanese feel 
inhibited in speaking because they have not been 
trained to make instinctive choices of article and 
number (Thompson, I. 1987, p. 218). 
Oddly, despite a consensus that the article system is 
irksome, little attention has been paid to it by teaching 
grammars. A survey of forty ESL grammar books published 
since 1980 (see Appendix A) shows that 28 percent say 
nothing about articles, while 20 percent stop short of 
meaning distinctions, limiting their scope to "user-
friendly" features such as allomorphic variation between a 
and an, constructions that favor certain articles (e.g. "use 
the with geographic locations"), or other clear-choice 
issues. The remaining 52 percent of the textbooks offer 
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vaguely stated rules of thumb with a few examples of dubious 
worth. 
For instance, the latter group frequently advised 
readers to use a with first mention of a noun and the with 
second. The advice is succinct, but not sound. 
Counterexamples abound in everyday language use: 
A: Have you heard from Joe? 
B: No, but the mail (first mention) hasn't come yet. 
The trouble (first mention) with Joe is he's moody. 
A: I'd like to stop at a look-out point (first mention). 
B: There's one (second mention) up ahead. 
A: A short hike (first mention) is a good hike (second 
mention). 
Researchers have found that in actual usage the instances of 
the which do not require prior mention or perceptibility 
are in "the great majority" (Hawkins 1991, p.415). This 
observation is supported by Du Bois' data from spoken 
renditions of the pear film by twenty English speakers. Of 
the 613 first-mention noun phrases (NPs), 34 percent took 
the while 4.1 percent of noninitial mentions took a(n). 
Pica (1983) found in her data on requests for directions 
from strangers that of the 37 times that a place was 
introduced with a, only twice was it referred to again with 
the. The other times the stranger or inquirer used a 
pronoun (it) or a synonym. 
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Paul Christophersen (1939) also found that the first-
mention-a; second-mention-the sequence was unnatural. The 
first two sentences from Stenning's 1976 study illustrate 
Christophersen's observation: "This chapter describes an 
experiment. The experiment investigates subjects' 
comprehension of English articles and quantifiers" (p. 193). 
Christophersen noted, "There is ... a certain aversion to the 
use of a the-form immediately after the word is introduced; 
a demonstrative [this, that, these, those ] is more usual in 
such cases: AV Job.1.1 There was a man in the land of Vz, 
whose name was Iob; and that man was perfect and 
upright/." (p. 29). The first-and-second-mention phenomena 
does occur in English but not by virtue of the relation 
suggested and not of ten enough to warrant the formation of a 
rule. Christophersen observed that the greater the distance 
between a word and its repetition, the more natural it is to 
use the definite article with the repetition. He used an 
example from the Grimm brothers: "Once upon a time there was 
a little princess whose father, the king, was dead, and 
whose mother, the queen, loved her very tenderly. When the 
princess grew up ... etc." (p. 29) (twenty-two syllables 
between first mention and second mention of the NP) . The 
controlling principle (as Chapter III will discuss) probably 
involves mutual knowledge of writer and reader. To 
introduce a referent into the contextual domain, a writer 
may use a and thereafter may use the to instruct the reader 
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to go back and locate that shared referent in recent memory. 
Perhaps the "aversion" that Christophersen alluded to 
results from instructing the reader to locate a referent 
that is virtually underfoot, its having been just 
introduced. This would also explain why demonstratives, 
being more proximate, would seem more appropriate 
immediately following introductions. 
An example of an a-the sequence that is not only 
awkward but also unacceptable is provided by Grannis (1972): 
I need a screwdriver to fix this television set. *The 
screwdriver is the only thing I can get out the tube with 
(p. 280). In this case and others like it (generic uses), 
the first-second-mention rule fails altogether. That ESL 
students could make use of simplifications of these article 
relations even with the more loosely formulated "previous" 
and "subsequent mention" rule is contradicted by everyday 
speech and reading materials. Nevertheless, sixty percent 
of the textbooks surveyed gave advice similar to that of 
Lites and Lehman (1990): "The first time you say a noun, use 
a/an ... After the first time, use the" (p. 58}. 
A second great failing of the ESL textbooks was the way 
they described mutual knowledge. Of the twenty-two books 
that addressed the article system, twelve (54 percent) 
mentioned speaker-hearer mutual knowledge.8 Mutual 
8 None of the textbooks used the term mutual kmowledge, but the wordsknow, knowing, knowledge, or 
known were used thirty times in phrases having the meaning of mutual knowledge, e.g. "known to both 
speaker and listener." 
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knowledge is a complex, pragmatic feature of the definite 
article whose ramifications cannot be easily reduced to a 
few pithy statements9, yet that was the offering in most 
cases, e.g.: "Use of the definite article indicates that the 
speaker ... and listener share a definite knowledge about the 
noun referred to" (Steer and Carlisi 1991, p. 216). One 
feeble exception was Kirn's Scenario Book 2 (1984a), which 
gave a list of ways a hearer might "know" what the speaker 
meant: "l. Sometimes a gesture identifies a noun. 
2.Sometimes the identification is in the previous sentence. 
3.Sometimes the identification is in the same sentence. 
4.Sometimes a noun needs no identification because it is 
specific from the context ... " (p. 85). Other authors 
described mutual knowledge in a way that only made sense 
under the interpretation that English speakers can read each 
others' minds: "The definite article the is used ... to show 
that ... both the speaker and the listener are thinking about 
exactly the same item" (Holschuh 1991, p. 88); " ... a noun 
can be definite because ... the people involved in the 
communication ... are living or thinking about the same 
situation, they know what to expect there." (Feigenbaum 
1985, p. 137). Several of the definitions were perplexing 
because it was hard to tell who the authors were addressing: 
"Use the article the with a noun when both the speaker and 
the listener know the specific thing(s) it is referring 
9 See pp. 56-58. 
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to ... " (Robinson 1989, p. 77); "Both the speaker and the 
listener know which one we are talking about" (Elbaum 1989, 
p. 194); "We use the when both the speaker and the listener 
know which item is meant" (Davis 1987, p. 19). 
Some authors liked to use the example of the earth's 
moon to illustrate an entity that is universally unique and 
therefore predictably definite. But having been told to 
always say the moon, the equator, the sun, etc., what must 
students think when they hear what English speakers really 
say? For example, English speakers sometimes say a moon: 
There's a full moon tonight. Emergency rooms get busy 
whenever it's a full moon. Students might hypothesize that 
English-speakers think of the phases of the lunar cycle as 
non-unique and therefore indefinite. But this cannot be the 
case: Did you see the full/crescent moon last night? 
Emergency rooms get busy whenever the moon is full. Even 
when a lunar phase is not mentioned, speakers still 
sometimes say a: A moon with a halo means it will rain. 
There's a moon out tonight. Will there be a moon on 
Halloween? Perhaps after the word there [existential] 
speakers say a. On the other hand, one sometimes hears the 
after the word there [referential]: Hey look, there's the 
moon--between those two buildings! 
Another failing of the textbooks was to equate the 
numeral one with the definite article. Forty percent of 
the textbooks made statements such as" . .. the limits the 
noun to the one specimen we are familiar with ... " (Frank 
1972, p. 128), and" ... when there is only one person or 
thing, use the ... " (Lites and Lehman 1990, p. 58). Yet 
counterexamples are everywhere: The roses are blooming 
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(there is more than one rose); The air is humid (there is 
not "one air"). Just how definite references are able to 
isolate more than one object but less than all of the 
objects in a shared set (e.g. more than one rose, but not 
all the roses in the garden) has been a topic of contention 
in the philosophy of English definiteness for at least the 
last hundred years. The idea that the means one was never 
one of these philosophies. The terms unique object or 
unique set is preferred because it implies plurality as well 
as perceptibility, that is, being perceptibly different from 
all others. In Christophersen's (1939) historical survey he 
noted that in all European languages that have an indefinite 
article, it is of the same root as the numeral one, and in 
Old English this root was represented by the form an. The 
definite article, on the other hand, is historically related 
to the demonstratives this and that. Modern theorists 
generally agree that when a speaker uses the definite 
article, he presumes that the hearer will be able to 
mentally represent the relevant referent within a shared set 
of objects or mass. If that shared set happens to contain 
just one object fitting the definite description, then that 
object is the referent and no modifiers are needed to 
35 
distinguish it from other objects. This is quite different 
from saying: when there is one object, use the, and implying 
thereby that if there is more than one, do not use the, to 
which the roses are blooming is a counterexample; or, 
neglecting the co-requirement of shared knowledge: A: Hand 
me the glomper. B: The what? A: There is only one glomper, 
therefore, you must know what I mean. B: But what is a 
glomper? 
Some of the textbooks claimed that a restrictive 
relative clause, or other modifier made the referent 
definite. A few correctly pointed out that this was not 
always the case. Holschuh (1991b) gave the appropriate 
warning but, unfortunately, provided a misleading example: 
When a noun is identified as a specific 
object ... by a phrase or a clause that follows 
it ... the definite article is used .... Be careful! 
A phrase or clause that follows a noun does not 
always identify it: I am fascinated by an idea 
that George mentioned to me. The listener isn't 
aware of the specific identity of the idea, only 
that George mentioned it. (p. 262) 
But Holschuh's interpretation in this example was misleading 
because the "specific identity of the idea" had no bearing 
on the choice of the article. Provided the hearer knew only 
that a unique idea existed, but not necessarily the content 
of that idea, the speaker could also have used the. 
Depending on the context a reader assumed, there were 
actually three possible interpretations of the indefinite 
article in Holschuh's example, none of which was the one 
Holschuh provided: Interpretation 1) The speaker knew that 
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the hearer had prior knowledge that George mentioned a 
unique idea ("X") to the speaker. Under these 
circumstances, the hearer would have expected the speaker to 
use the definite article: [As you know] I am fascinated by 
the idea [X] that George mentioned to me [Let me tell you 
about it]. But since the speaker instead used the 
indefinite article, the hearer now had to infer that the 
speaker was not referring to the idea that he and the 
speaker were both aware of, idea X, but must have been 
referring to some other idea that George mentioned: I am 
fascinated by an idea (not X) that George mentioned to me. 
Interpretation 2) The speaker had no prior knowledge of 
George's mentioning any idea(s) to the speaker. In this 
case, use of an would mean [You don't know this yet, but] I 
am fascinated by an idea that George mentioned to me. The 
hearer would be unable to tell from the speaker's statement 
whether George had mentioned several ideas, one of which was 
fascinating, or whether George had mentioned just one 
fascinating idea. Interpretation 3) The hearer had prior 
knowledge that George mentioned several ideas to the 
speaker. In this context, an would mean I am fascinated by 
an (one of the) idea(s) that George mentioned to me. 
On Holschuh's interpretation, that George mentioned 
only one idea to the speaker (as Holschuh seems to suggest 
by his use of "the idea" and "it" in his explanation), and 
the hearer knew that George mentioned it, the should have 
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been used: [As you know,] I am fascinated by the [one and 
only] idea (X) that George mentioned to me. [Let me tell you 
about it]. On the other hand, if the hearer had prior 
knowledge that George had mentioned several ideas to the 
speaker, then the speaker correctly chose an, but Holschuh 
failed to properly account for the speaker's choice by 
failing to thoroughly disclose the assumed background, 
namely that George had mentioned several ideas. If students 
seriously took time to learn rules like Holschuh's, they 
would have to take additional time to "unlearn" them, 
picking up counter-evidence by chance in what they read and 
heard around them. The first rule of second-language 
instruction, like that of the medical profession, should be 
"do no harm." 
The textbooks shared a common problem in offering too 
few sample sentences. Most gave two samples per "rule," 
then a series of fill-in-the-blank exercises. Often, the 
two examples floated in a context-less void; students 
apparently were expected to take the author's word when the 
NP was "(un) known" or "(un) specified." "Tom sat down on a 
chair. We don't know which chair" (Murphy 1989 p. 134). 
And, "The most common use of the indefinite article,a(an), 
is to signal an unspecified item ... He wants a bicycle. 
Notice that there is no attempt to make the noun specific. 
The noun is indefinite." (Smalley and Hank 1990, p. 105). 
And from Elbaum (1989), "We use a/an to mean an indefinite 
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one. It is not important to know exactly which one: I have 
a book. I need an eraser" (p. 192). 
Too often a "context-less void" surrounded fill-in-the-
blank exercises. For example, students would be given a 
battery of unrelated sentences with the articles missing: 
While he was in park, he saw man walking with 
~~-dog (Frank 1986b, p.157). Depending on the context 
envisioned, there could be many correct answers: While he 
was in the [local] park, he saw the man [he was looking for] 
walking with Q [strange] dog. While he was in Q [local] 
park, he saw Q [strange] man walking with the [neighbor's] 
dog. While he was [visiting] an [unfamiliar] park, he saw Q 
man walking with Q dog, [a boy riding a bike, and a woman 
strolling a baby.] etc. Despite the variability of 
interpretation, students were led to believe that there was 
just one correct answer for each blank. 
There were many dizzying instances of circular 
definition: "When a noun is used in a definite sense, it 
refers to a specific object ... " (Holschuh 199lb, p.261); 
"Use the definite article, the, when you want to point 
something out and make it definite ... Use the indefinite 
article, a(an), with singular nouns that are not definite" 
(Claire 1988, p. 27) . Or, "A specific reference is known 
by the writer and by the reader as something unique, 
specific, or familiar ... " (Raimes 1987, p.131). 
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In some places the advice offered by the textbooks was 
incomprehensible: "Use the with things that are the only 
ones of their kind. There may be others in the same class of 
things, but we don't usually think about them" (Claire 1988, 
p. 24); "The definite article is used before a noun which by 
reason of locality can represent only one particular thing: 
Ann is in the garden." (Thomson and Martinet 1986, p.19); 
"The occurs with names for familiar persons or objects in 
the home and the community. It is also used with names for 
natural objects in the world and in the universe" (Frank 
1986a p. 156). 
Molhot's (1980) words are as apt today as they were 
fourteen years ago: " ... we need a better definition ... than 
to say [the J is used for subsequent mention, unique 
entities, or nouns which have 'undergone' definitization" 
(p. 14). But to be fair, the faults of ESL textbooks may 
not lie entirely with their authors. The article system is 
complicated; adequate treatment requires many different 
kinds of examples and illustrated contexts. These needs are 
in opposition to those of textbook publishers who must 
concern themselves with space and production costs. The 
limitations of traditional publishing may explain why some 
authors omitted so much information while others seemed to 
"load" their rules with too many concepts.IO 
10An example of a "loaded" rule was found in Chafe (1970): "When we use the definite article the we 
presume that both we and the hearer know what is being talked about. This is not the case when we use 
the indefinite article. Most of the words we have considered so far are indefinite; but if we want to express 
indefinite meaning without any added meaning of amount.etc, we use the indefinite article a(n) (with 
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For whatever reasons, treatments of the article system 
have been so poorly handled by some textbooks that the best 
books turn out to be those which have offered no treatment 
at all. But despite the shortage of good materials, 
Japanese students in general do, miraculously, show 
increasing proficiency over years of study. It is possible 
that those who improve adopt a strategy to disregard what 
the grammar books say so that their natural inferences will 
not be hampered. 
Clearly, there is room for improvement, but it is 
unlikely that the hard copy textbook can ever provide a good 
solution to the problem. Even the most stellar textbook 
treatment can only awkwardly capture the heavy 
contextualization that informs article usage. A 
computerized tutorial can provide the contextualization, 
interaction, and attention that the article system deserves. 
Throughout most of this chapter the issue of frequency 
has been raised. Since an article occurs approximately 
every tenth word, a thirty-percent error rate among Japanese 
college students manifests as roughly ten errors per page of 
written text. This high rate suggests that the articles are 
difficult morphemes to master. The difficulty is 
corroborated by Ll and L2 morpheme studies, which rank the 
articles low in order of acquisition/ accuracy. Lack of 
exposure cannot account for the difficulty since frequency 
singular count nouns), or the zero indefinite article with mass nouns or plural count nouns: Would you like a 
drink?" 
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of occurrence in native input is optimal. There must be an 
alternative explanation for the difficulty: semantic 
complexity is suggested. Given the scope of the problem, 
one might expect to find thorough treatments of it in 
teaching grammars, but this is not the case. Authors and 
publishers have given it scarce attention. The deficiency 
is revealed by a survey of forty English-as-a-second-
language (ESL) textbooks. Considering the complexity of the 
article system, even improved hard copy textbooks may never 
be adequate. Computerized tutorials are recommended. 
Chapter III reviews scholarly investigations of the 
twentieth century to better understand how native speakers 
use the article system. 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Almost a century of thought underlies modern theories 
of definiteness. Beginning with Bertrand Russell's 1905 
paper "On Denoting" and culminating in John Hawkins' 1991 
paper "On (In)definite Articles:Implicatures and 
(Un)grammaticality Prediction," this scholarly debate has 
centered around definitions of and interdependencies among 
certain principles of article usage: uniqueness, shared 
knowledge, semantic meaning, and pragmatic meaning. 
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Part I of this chapter surveys investigations prior to 
the inclusion of H.P. Grice's principles of conversational 
cooperation. Published in 1975, the ideas in Grice's "Logic 
and Conversation" began to appear in work on the article 
system in about 1979. Part II of this chapter shows how 
Grice's maxims helped explain much of the variability in 
article interpretation ignored by previous treatments. 
I. EARLY PHILOSOPHIES 
Russell 1905 
Bertrand Russell's 1905 paper, "On Denoting," was one 
of the first formal accounts of the definite article. 
43 
Russell's theory of meaning fell within an encompassing 
theory of knowledge and the question of how it is that we 
know about things we cannot perceive such as points in the 
solar system or other people's thoughts. We must, he held, 
rely on words to transmit these ideas. Specifically, we 
must rely on "denoting phrases," phrases containing words 
like every, no, some, and the, the last of which he 
considered "the most interesting and difficult of denoting 
phrases" (p. 481). To understand the exact meanings of 
denoting phrases, Russell reduced them to symbols and 
reduced the sentences in which they functioned to 
propositions that could then be judged as either true or 
false. Hence, the father of Charles II was executed reduced 
to C(x) where C stood for was executed and x stood for the 
father of Charles II. But whatever statement C might stand 
for, C (the father of Charles II) implied that Charles II 
had one father and no more due to the "uniqueness" of the 
word the: "Now the, when it is strictly used, involves 
uniqueness ... thus when we say 'x was the father of Charles 
II' we not only assert that x had a certain relation to 
Charles II, but also that nothing else had this relation" 
(p.482). Russell reasoned that if the condition that 
Charles II had only one father failed, then all propositions 
of the form C(the father of Charles II) would also be false. 
Of course, since Charles II had only one father, there could 
be no such categorical falsehoods. However, statements of 
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the kind the present king of France is bald, or (C(the 
present king of France)), could be false, according to 
Russell, in three cases: 1) when there is only one king of 
France and he is not bald; 2) when there is no king of 
France (nonexistence); 3) when there is more than one king 
of France (nonuniqueness) . If any of these three were true 
then is bald would be false. Thus, Russell constructed two 
strict criteria under which, as he put it, the so-and-so, 
could succeed, namely, existence and uniqueness. Denying 
either of these would result in the falsity of the 
proposition. In short, the asserted existence and 
uniqueness. 
Strawson 1950 
In 1950, forty-five years after Russell's account, P.F. 
Strawson challenged the supposed falsehood of the 
proposition is bald caused by the second of the three 
conditions, namely, the denial of the existence assertion, 
i.e., when there is no king of France. Strawson argued that 
C statements (is bald) were neither true nor false if the 
presupposed statement (There exists a king of France) were 
false because there was no king. In other words, the 
question of the truth of the C statement (is bald) would be 
relevant only if the presupposed statement (There exists a 
king of France) were true; the question of its truth would 
be irrelevant if the presupposed statement were false in the 
case where a king of France did not exist. Therefore, 
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Strawson reasoned, Russell's analysis did not reflect the 
correct meaning of the definite article because in ordinary 
language speakers would not judge sentences like the king of 
France is bald to be false on the grounds that the 
existence claim was false; instead, the question of truth or 
falsity simply would not arise. For all they knew, The king 
of France could be a fictional king who lived in a golden 
castle and had a hundred wives. Strawson condemned 
Russell's use of strict logic and truth conditions for the 
description of natural language, saying "ordinary language 
has no logic" (p.344). 
Strawson's second point of contention with Russell was 
over Russell's claim that use of the definite article 
asserted uniqueness. Rather, Strawson argued, use of the 
definite article made reference to an object that was 
unique: 
Now it is obviously quite false that the phrase 
"the table" in the sentence "the table is covered 
with books", used normally, will "only have an 
application in the event of there being one table 
and no more" ... the phrase will have an application 
only in the event of there being one table and no 
more which is being referred to .... " (Strawson 
1905, p. 332). 
He went on to say that when speakers began a sentence with 
the so-and-so, the use of the showed that [they] were 
referring to one particular individual of the species, and 
they were presuming that the context would "sufficiently 
determine which one [the speaker had] in mind" (p. 332). It 
was on the strength of this second argument that Strawson 
46 
entitled his paper "On Referring," in distinction to 
Russell's "On Denoting." The two titles succinctly captured 
the philosophers' respective positions. Russell's position 
did not allow a gray area in respect of truth values and did 
not allow logical form to interact with context. Strawson's 
position, on the contrary, rejected strict logic altogether 
and made interaction of form with context a requirement. 
Both philosopers limited their uniqueness definitions to 
singular nouns, making no provisions for plural or mass 
nouns. 
Mccawley (1981) pointed out that Strawson's 
modification of uniqueness did not go so far as to allow 
that speakers could successfully ref er to one prominent 
object out of several similar ones, the prominence of the 
one being decided by context. McCawley's example, The 
restaurant on Clark Street is excellent, illustrated how, 
when uttered by the right speaker to the right hearer at the 
right place and time could identify a particular restaurant 
out of many. In other words, Strawson had overlooked 
Russell's third case of alleged falsehood--when there is 
more than one king. 
Jespersen 1933 
Otto Jespersen devoted twenty pages to the definite and 
indefinite articles in his Essentials of English Grammar 
(1933). Mostly it was a listing of occasional uses such as 
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the with names of oceans, titles of persons, countries, 
streets, etc. But in one phrase he spoke of the use of the 
definite article to indicate the thing that "is uppermost in 
the mind of the speaker and presumably in that of the hearer 
too" (p. 162). This insight was a glimmer of the speaker-
hearer knowledge issue that future linguists would examine 
very closely. 
Christophersen 1939 
The idea of speaker-hearer knowledge was expanded into 
the theory of familiarity by Paul Christophersen in his 1939 
treatise, The Articles.11 Unlike Jespersen's view, which saw 
hearer knowledge as peripheral to definite reference, 
Christophersen's theory saw hearer knowledge as central: "A 
condition of the use of the is that there is a basis of 
understanding between speaker and hearer ... and the speaker 
as the active party must ... adapt his language to the 
hearer's state of mind" (p. 28). Probing the notion of 
hearer knowledge more deeply, Christophersen identified 
three "bases of understanding" which a speaker could use to 
reasonably predict that a hearer would comprehend a definite 
reference: 1) explicit contextual basis (introduction and 
subsequent mention, i.e.,Once upon a time there lived an old 
tailor in a small village. The tailor ... etc.); 2) implicit 
contextual basis (having mentioned to swear a speaker could 
11 Christophersen wrote, "The familiarity-theory is widespread and old." He referred to Aa Hansen's 
dissertation Bestemt og ubestemt Substantiv. Copenhagen 1927 and to G. Brown's The Grammar of 
English Grammars. New York 1861. 
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then go on to talk about the oath or having spoken the words 
a tailor could then say the man); and 3) situational basis 
(situated in a railway-carriage, the speaker could begin a 
conversation about the [luggage] rack). Provided that a 
basis existed, a speaker could use the to signal a hearer 
that a referent was in some way "familiar" to both of them. 
Unlike Russell, Christophersen argued that the definite 
article could refer to one prominent object out of several 
similar ones (i.e. when there is more than one king). He 
wrote, "The existence of the proper basis of understanding 
means that the hearer's field of attention is so narrow at 
the moment of receiving the communication that only one 
individual (the one meant) is evoked mentally by the the-
form" (p. 29). As with singular entities, the could mark 
off precise limits when referring to plurals as in Keep 
clear of the Propellers (notice on steamers in harbour) (p. 
36), and could isolate parts out of wholes when referring to 
mass nouns such as water: She poured some water in a kettle 
and put it on the fire; half a minute later the water was 
boiling (p. 34). 
Christophersen's familiarity theory emphasized the 
basis of understanding between interlocutors. " ... the 
article the is to refer to this basis, to indicate 'the 
thing you know'" (p. 70) . 
Searle 1969 
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John Searle sought to define the definite article 
within speech act theory. He argued that in the act of 
definitely referring a speaker picked out, or identified a 
particular object which he could then go on to talk about. 
Upon being asked "what?" or "who?" in reply to a definite 
reference (A:The man ... B: What man?), the speaker could 
"guarantee" a description that would positively identify the 
referent for the hearer. The use of the implied the 
guarantee. Searle outlined three ways that the guarantee 
could be communicated, either implicitly by the article the, 
or explicitly, on demand: 1) the utterance could contain a 
description true only of the object; 2) the utterance in 
combination with the context could provide an ostensive or 
indexical presentation of the object; 3) the utterance could 
contain some combination of these two. But Searle was 
mainly concerned that referring be the act of picking out an 
object that happened to exist and be unique. Instead of 
hitting an individual on the head to pick him out, speakers 
could refer to him. Thus, speakers could "do things with 
words." 12 
Hawkins 1978 
In Definiteness and Indefiniteness (1978) John Hawkins 
claimed that use of the definite article was an instruction 
to the hearer to "locate" a referent among a shared set of 
12 from J. L. Austin (1955) How to Do Things with Words. 
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objects. Like Christophersen, Hawkins described how 
speakers, by using the, could not only isolate a single 
object among several similar ones, but could also mark off 
precise limits of plurals, and could identify subparts of 
mass entities. This precision Hawkins called inclusiveness. 
Once the hearer located the set of shared objects, use of 
the referred "inclusively" to all the objects within a 
domain of quantification which [had already been] 
pragmatically restricted" (p. 160). The sentence bring in 
the wickets referred inclusively to all six wickets on a 
particular cricket field, not to four or five wickets. 
Reference to a set meant reference to all the pragmatically 
relevant objects in the set. Thus, the with singular nouns 
was an instance of inclusive reference to ALL, which happened 
to equal a totality of just one object. Following Searle, 
speakers in Hawkins' location theory performed not one but 
three speech acts whenever they used the definite article: 
1) they introduced a referent(s) (wickets) 2) they 
instructed the hearer to locate the referent(s) in a shared 
set of objects (the wickets on a particular playing field), 
and 3) they referred to all the objects or mass within this 
set that satisfied the pragmatics of the sentence (all six 
wickets). 
The indefinite article (a/some) referred exclusively 
to only a subset of the relevent objects, as in bring in 
some wickets. But when the NP had a potential uniqueness 
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relationship with the shared set, the indefinite article 
could not refer to that object, and the hearer had to search 
outside the shared set in order to locate the correct 
referent. In Hawkins' example, I bought a book and talked 
to an author about it, the NP, author, had a potential 
uniqueness relationship with the shared set, the book. 
Therefore the would be the expected choice of article. 
However, since the speaker chose an author, the correct 
referent could not be the author holding the uniqueness 
relationship with the shared set, the author of the book in 
question; consequently, the hearer had to search outside the 
relevant set to find the correct referent, the author of 
some other book. Unlike the definite article which to 
referred to ALL the relevant members of a set, the indefinite 
article either referred exclusively outside the shared set 
(to the author of some other book) or, when there was no 
potential uniqueness relationship, it referred exclusively 
to a subset of the shared set (some of the wickets). 
Summary 
Except in the case of Russell, all of the foregoing 
discussions bore on issues of reference and speaker-hearer 
knowledge. Russell argued that the asserted uniqueness and 
existence; Strawson replied that it referred to a uniquely 
existing object. Jespersen hinted at speaker-hearer 
knowledge; Christophersen elaborated on common bases of 
understanding, or "familiarity" conditions by which a 
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speaker could know a hearer's mind. Searle maintained that 
speakers used the definite article to communicate uniquely 
existential propositions (facts). He defined referring as 
the act of picking out an object, then saying something 
about it. For Hawkins, the definite article instructed the 
hearer to locate the referent in a shared set of objects. 
The sentence referred to all the objects in that set, which 
had already been pragmatically delimited. The aim of the 
next section is to show how Gricean principles of 
conversation caused Hawkins to revise his theory. 
II. LATER PHILOSOPHIES 
Grice 1975 
In an influential paper in 1975, H.P.Grice put forth 
his view of language use as a manifestation of human 
cooperation. One feature of this view was that speakers 
were able to convey (and intended to convey) more 
information than they actually uttered. This was because 
hearers naturally expected speakers to make statements that 
showed a spirit of cooperative talk exchange, statements 
that were true, informative, clear, and relevant; and, when 
speakers seemed to fall short of these four maxims, hearers 
managed rich interpretations that fullf illed their 
expectations just the same (Newmeyer 1986). Put crudely, 
hearers filled in the gaps. An example was given by Kempson 
(1988): A: What's the new Pizza House like? B: The cooks are 
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Italian. B's response implied that the food was authentic 
and delicious yet inexpensive, that the coffee was good, 
etc. This response conveyed more information than a direct 
answer would have and was thus more relevant. Grice coined 
the term implicature to mean the information conveyed by an 
utterance over and above its propositional content. In 
Kempson's example, the propositional content was that the 
cooks were Italian. The implicatures were that the food was 
delicious yet inexpensive, the atmosphere was relaxed, or 
whatever else the hearer employed to satisfy the Maxim of 
Relevance, the maxim that seemed to have been violated by 
the indirectness of B's response but in fact was not. 
Relevant information was implicated by B, inferred by A. 
As Sperber & Wilson (1986) noted "Grice put forward an idea 
of fundamental importance: that the very act of 
communicating creates expectations which it then exploits" 
(p. 37). 
Not only could the meanings of whole utterances be 
better understood in terms of implicatures, but individual 
words could, too. For example, it was observed that logical 
connectives such as and, or, if ... then, not made richer 
contributions to natural language utterances than could be 
represented by their logical denotations. These richer 
meanings could be explained in terms of implicatures. For 
instance, the conventional lexical entry for the word and 
was its function as a logical conjunction. But in the 
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sentence put the gear shift into neutral and turn the key in 
the ignition, the word and would be enriched to and then 
by the Maxim of Manner, "be orderly," or "be sequential." 
After the publication of Grice's paper, linguists 
continued to develop implicature theories of increasing 
subtlty to explain regularities of language use that 
semantic and syntactic theories had failed to capture. The 
contrast between the and a would be one such regularity. 
Critiques of Hawkins' 1978 theory led him to write an 
article which he published in 1991, wherein he revised his 
theory and incorporated many of his critics' ideas. In this 
revised article, entitled "On (In)definite Articles: 
Implicatures and (Un)grarrunatically Prediction" (1991), 
Hawkins drew on the works of many authors (Sperber & Wilson, 
Levinson, Kempson, and Horn) to create a "neo-Gricean" 
implicature theory of article usage. 
Reviews of Hawkins 1978 
Many of Hawkins' critics found that some of the 
functions he attributed to conventional meanings of the 
articles were actually the result of Gricean implicature. 
For example, Hawkins had claimed that definite 
reference to a set meant reference to all of the objects in 
the set satisfying the descriptive predicate or context. 
Declerk (1987) disputed such a comprehensive definition of 
the definite article. He argued that the meaning of the 
could be split in two. In its conventional meaning, the 
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meant reference just to a (shared) set, whereas in its 
conversational meaning, the meant reference to all the 
objects in the set unless pragmatic factors excluded some 
of the objects. Declerck contended that the former meaning, 
which in essence was Hawkins' instruction to "locate" a 
shared set, was inherent to the definite article, whereas 
the latter meaning followed as an implicature from its use. 
The origin of this implicature was Grice's Maxim of 
Quantity, which said that the speaker must make his 
contribution as informative as required for the purposes of 
the comunicative exchange. If the speaker wanted to limit 
the set to a subset, he had to do so explicitely (bring in 
three of the wickets), but if the speaker did not 
explicitely limit the shared set, the hearer had the right, 
by the Maxim of Quantity, to assume that the speaker had 
been as informative as necessary and that, therefore, 
reference was to the whole shared set, e.g., to "all the 
wickets." Thus, for Declerck, "inclusiveness" within the 
shared set, (i.e., delimitation to a subset), was a 
pragmatic function of the rest of sentence (or context) in 
conjunction with the definite article, but was not, as 
Hawkins had claimed, an inherent function of the definite 
article itself. 
Ewan Klein saw implicature theory as an alternative to 
Hawkins' analysis of the indefinite article. He observed 
that the was logically stronger than a and that by Grice's 
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Maxim of Quantity a speaker should use the if he were in a 
position to do so. Therefore, if he used a, he was 
conversationally implicating that he could not make the 
"inclusiveness" claim associated with the. 
D.A. Cruse also suggested conversational implicature in 
the use of a: "First, we need to assume a general 
conversational principle that a speaker MUST use a definite 
article if he can do so appropriately" (p. 314). 
John Hawkins 1991 
In 1991, John Hawkins revised his location theory to 
include, among other changes, conversational implicatures. 
But first, he redefined several terms. He resurrected and 
updated Bertrand Russell's 1905 claim that use of the 
asserted existence and uniqueness. He updated it by saying 
that the claim only held within certain pragmatic 
parameters, or P-sets, as he called them. The P-sets were 
similar to Hawkins 1978 "uses" and to Christophersen's 
"bases of understanding." They were: 1) physical setting 
[of the utterance] set; 2)"linguistic" community set; 3) set 
resulting from bridgingl3; and, 4) previous discourse set. 
Existence and uniqueness were asserted by the, but were only 
definable relative to a P-set. 
13The term bridging was first used by Clark and Haviland (1977) to describe certain inferences that the 
speaker intends the hearer to draw in order to compute the intended antecedent. The hearer bridges, or 
constructs certain implicatures to compute the antecedent. Consider, I looked into the room. The ceiling 
was high. Since all rooms have one ceiling, the ceiling can be definite provided the hearer constructs the 
following bridge, or implicature: The room mentioned has a ceiling; that ceiling is the antecedent of the 
ceiling. 
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A second change in Hawkins' revised theory was to 
expand the definition of uniqueness. Since the term unique 
connoted one, it worked well when Russell had applied it to 
singular nouns such as the father of Charles II. But when 
applied to plurals and mass nouns, unique was a 
contradiction in terms. To avoid this problem in his 
original theory, Hawkins had used the term "inclusiveness", 
i.e. the referred "inclusively" to ALL the relevant 
object(s) or mass in a shared set. In the 1991 revision, 
Hawkins went back to Russell's term, unique, but broadened 
it so that all uses of the term unique were to be 
understood as unique maximal set, a suggestion made by Klein 
(1980). In this way, plurals such as the bridesmaids would 
comprise a unique maximal set of bridesmaids and the cake 
would comprise a unique maximal amount of cake in a P-set 
such as a wedding. 
A third change in Hawkins' 1991 theory was to abandon 
the term shared knowledge 14 in favor of Sperber & Wilson's 
(1986), mutual manifestness and mutual cognitive 
environments. The term shared knowledge had implied an 
epistemological knowledge that was shared a priori. The 
term had failed to accomodate first-mention uses of the, 
uses where the hearer had no knowledge of the referent 
before its initial mention. These, according to Hawkins, 
14 The term mutual knowledge is found throughout the literature on definiteness (xxx), but as Sperber 
& Wilson (1986) argue, the term has problems of infinite regress, e.g., She knows that he knows that she 
knows that she doesn't see what he sees, etc., ad infinitum. In other words, knowledge can only be 
mutual after an infinite number of regressions, hence mutual knowledge is an insolvable paradox. 
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were the vast majority of instances in English. Hawkins' 
new terms, mutual manifestness and mutual cognitive 
environments, broadened the kind of knowledge that definite 
reference would allow by making it cognitive rather than 
epistemological. If a fact or an assumption were manifest 
to an individual, he was capable of representing it mentally 
and accepting it as true or probably true. An indivdual's 
cognitive environment consisted of all the facts and 
assumptions that could be perceived or inferred because they 
were manifest. The expression mutual cognitive environment 
referred to all of the facts and assumptions manifest to 
speaker and hearer: "Peter and Mary are talking to each 
other in the same room: they share a cognitive environment 
which consists of all the facts made manifest to them by 
their presence in this room. One of these facts is that 
fact that they share this environment" (p. 41) . 
With the concept manifest knowledge it was now 
possible to explain how a speaker could use the even though 
a hearer had no prior knowledge, in the epistemological 
sense, of the referent. As Christophersen (1939) had 
observed, these were cases when "the [author] preferred to 
jump in medias res and leave the reader to find out for 
himself what [was] meant ... Example: Wells (The Invisible 
Man) The stranger came in February" (p. 29). A reader could 
"mentally represent," or imagine, a unique and existing 
stranger on the author's word, without previous mention of 
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one.15 Mutually manifest knowledge could account for all the 
counterexamples to the prior-mention-takes-a-subsequent-
mention-takes-the notion because a speaker could say the 
whenever he judged a noun to be mutually manifest to himself 
and his hearer. 
The most important change in Hawkins' theory was to 
explain (in)definite reference in terms of Gricean 
implicatures. Instead of referring directly to an entity, 
the article+NP+context framework conversationally implicated 
pragmatic parameters (P-sets) and uniqueness values relative 
to which an entity could be located and identified as the 
entity meant. In the case of the definite article there was 
also a conventional implicature, which functioned 
independently of conversational analysis. A conventional 
implicature was "essential to the meaning of [a word], 
rather than derived from that meaning by means of 
conversational principles" (Leech 1983, p. 90). In Hawkins' 
revised system the conventionally implicated that there was 
some set of entities, {P}, in the universe of discourse 
which was mutually manifest to speaker and hearer on-line 
and within which definite referent(s) existed and were 
unique. 
15 Brown (1973) also observed the use of the definite article in medias res . "It seems as if the speaker 
when he knows more about a given stable part-whole relation than his listener sometimes speaks from his 
own information letting his choice of article instruct the listener" The part-whole relation he referred to was 
in the example The tenor soloist in Verdi's Requiem. A hearer might not have prior knowledge of Verdi's 
Requiem having only one tenor soloist; nevertheless, a speaker might choose the as a kind of instruction 
to the listener. (p. 347). 
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In addition to inducing a conventional implicature, the 
could also induce one conversational implicature--by the 
(I)-Principle. Inducing no conventional implicatures, 
a/some could induce only conversational implicatures--by 
the {Q)-Principle and the (I)-Principle. Both the (Q)- and 
the {I)- Principles were adapted from Levinson's (1983, 
1987) refinements of Gricean Maxims. The {Q)-Principle 
required the speaker to not provide a statement that was 
informationally weaker than his knowledge of the world 
allowed. The hearer's corollary to the {Q)-Principle 
required the hearer to take the speaker's statement as the 
strongest statement the speaker could make consistent with 
what the speaker knew. If the speaker said some of my best 
friends are academics, the hearer should take it that not 
all of my best friends are academics because the stronger 
statement, all of my best friends are academics was not 
used, and therefore its negation was implicated. 
The (I) Principle required the speaker to say as little 
as possible (produce the minimal linguistic structures) to 
achieve his communicational end. The hearer's corollary 
required the hearer to enrich the content of the speaker's 
utterance by finding the most specific likely 
interpretation. If the speaker said if you mow the lawn 
I'll give you $20, the hearer should infer if you mow the 
lawn, and only if you mow the lawn, I'll give you $20. 
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There was an obvious tension between these two 
principles: the speaker should make the informationally 
strongest statement by the (Q)-Principle, yet should also 
make the minimal linguistic statement by the (I)- Principle. 
But the two could function at once, according to Levinson, 
because Q-implicatures were calculated first and were 
limited to a small set of linguistic expressions on Horn 
scales such as <n, ... 5,4,3,2,1>; <all, most, many, some, 
few>; <excellent, good>. The selection of a weaker item on 
the right of a scale would induce implicatures negating all 
items to the left. Thus, the meal was good would (Q)-
implicate that the meal was not excellent. If the (Q)-
Principle applied, then the (I)-Principle did not apply. If 
the (Q}-Principle did not apply then the (I)-Principle 
could. 
Hawkins argued that the articles were also arranged on 
a Horn scale, <the, a>. The selection of a implied the 
negation of the, provided the could have been used. If 
the could not have been used, then the (Q)-Principle would 
not apply. For example, in an American newspaper headline 
such as a president has resigned, the stronger form, the, 
could have been used because there is a unique American 
president. But because the writer chose the informationally 
weaker form, a, he effectively negated the and thereby 
induced the (Q)-implicature not the president [of the 
country] has resigned [but the president of some other 
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country]. On the other hand, in the headline a senator has 
resigned, the could not have been used because the 
uniqueness requirement did not obtain (i.e.,senator is not 
unique). Therefore, the (Q)-Principle did not apply (and 
its implicature, not the, did not apply). Instead, if a P-
set existed in which the referent could exist (in this case 
a set did exist in the set of U.S. senators), then the (I)-
Principle induced the richer statement one of the senators 
has resigned. To select the correct implicature for the 
indefinite article, the hearer had to first determine 
whether or not the could have been used. If it could have 
been used (because the referent was a unique maximal set and 
because there was mutual manifest knowledge), then the (Q)-
Principle applied and a meant not the. Conversely, if the 
could not have been used (because either uniqueness or 
mutual manifest knowledge or both did not obtain), then the 
(Q)-Principle did not apply; instead, provided a P-set 
existed, a was enriched by the (I)-Principle to one of the. 
Enrichment to one of the was only implicated if pragmatic 
information allowed (i.e., if a P-set existed in the 
conversational context). If pragmatic conditions did not 
allow enrichment, then a would simply remain a and the NP 
would be interpreted as non-unique and not a P-set member.16 
16 The statement I am fascinated by an idea that George mentioned to me can be interpreted three 
ways in terms of implicature theory: Interpretation 1) if the could have been used (because the 
requirements for its conventional implicature obtained, that is, the hearer knew there was a unique idea 
and that George mentioned it), then use of an would (Q)-implicate non-uniqueness, i.e., not the idea in the 
P-set but some other idea outside the P-set; Interpretation 2) if there were a P-set in which the referent 
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While the indefinite article induced either a (Q)- or 
(I)-implicature, the definite article induced either the 
conventional implicature or, in cases of bridging, an (I)-
implicature. The (I)-implicated that if a P-set existed in 
which it were possible for the NP to be unique, then the NP 
was indeed unique within that P-set. For example, mention 
of the class allowed mention of the professor because 
there was a P-set, the class, in which the professor could 
be unique. The (I)-Principle enriched the professor to the 
professor of the class. All cases where the (I)-implicated 
were cases of bridging. 
To summarize, the implicature induced by a/some of non-
uniqueness ("not the") resulted in non-P-membership of 
unique entities (not the president) by the (Q)-Principle (do 
not say more than you know) . The implicature induced by 
a/some of P-membership ("one of the") for non-unique 
entities (a senator) was made possible by the (I)-Principle 
(do not be prolix). The (I)-implicature (induced by the) of 
P-membership ("of the") for unique entities (the professor) 
was possible if there was a P-set (the class). Finally, the 
conventional implicature (induced by the) meant that there 
was a mutually manifest P-set within which the NP existed 
and was unique; the hearer should locate it. 
could exist (i.e.,the hearer knew that George had mentioned several ideas to the speaker), then use of an 
would (!)-implicate P-membership. That is, this idea was one of the ones George mentioned, and an would 
be enriched to one of the ideas; Interpretation 3) if there were no P-set (i.e., the hearer had no knowledge 
of George's mentioning any ideas to the speaker), then use of an would implicate non-P-membership, and 
the hearer would not be able to infer if an were unique (an idea) or not unique (one of the ideas). 
John Hawkin's implicature theory will serve as the 
theoretical background for the design of the tutorial, 




THE VISUALS FOR THE TUTORIAL 
The illustrations on the following pages should be 
considered visual aids to understanding the sampling of 
story scripts in Chapter IV. Each illustration represents a 
frame excerpted from the story "Eric Opens a Window." The 
illustrations show what a user would see on the screen: the 
command options in the margins and the visual gimmick for 
the characters' "asides"--the small screen with a small Kato 
and Eric surrrounded by the "real" screen with a large Kato 
and Eric. 
In an actual tutorial, a brief introduction to the 
pragmatics of article function would precede the stories so 
that terms in the explanations such as unique and manifest 
would have clear meanings to the user. 
The grammatical explanations are complex and well 
beyond the level of the average high school student, even in 
translation. The intended audience is college and graduate-
level students. Teachers of ESL, both English-speaking and 
Japanese-speaking, could also find the explanations 
insightful. 
99 
M.3llA AH.LOllOO 17661 
0 
4 * '1 -::;/. \, ..lj.fiil~!€ ~!I-\, ~(L) [ggfM 








For a Japanese translation at any time, click 
on the Rising Sun symbol. Press the Return 





We will use THE in some sentences and 
A in other sentences. We will explain 
From now on, the right arrow will take 
you forward. The left arrow will take ._ 
'= II you back. When you see this>> at the 
....... ______ .,. end of the text you are reading, it's a 





Eric, would you please 
open the window? 
14114 
was referring to was unique in this , • 
room and because it was manifest 
to Eric - he could see it. 
Click on ## to see if a noun is 










THE-FORM I the window 
Click on ABC for sample sentences. 
ABC##OCj 
Good windows let in light and keep out cold. 
My office doesn't have a window. 
Some windows are impossible to open. 
The baseball went through the bay window. 
The windows in the basement need cleaning. 
SINGULAR PLURAL 
-, Fl 1 ZERO-FORM windows 
• 
AlsoME-FORM a window some windows 







To the left of some scenes, you will see 
one or more objects. When you click on 
an object, the scene will change slightly. 
The new scene will cause the speaker to 
change his choice of article. Click on the 




0 K, I'll open this one. ITE1l 
~ 5"T ... + 
Eric, please open a window 
~ I wanted Eric to open just one of the two windows, so I used 
the singular form, WINDOW. I 
couldn't use THE because there 
was no unique window in the 
set of windows that could be 
opened. Either window could 
be opened (THE is unable to 
refer when no unique set 
exists). I had to use A as the 
short form of ONE OF THE. If I 
had said, "Eric, please open the 
window, " Eric would have 
said, "Which window?" 
That's right Kato. 
Because there were 
two windows that 
could be opened, I took 
A to mean ONE OF THE. 
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[rJ tt4 • • 
if I 
Eric, would you open 
the windows? 
I wanted Eric to open both 
windows, so I used the 
plural form WINDOWS. I used THE 
because I meant the unique maximal 
set of windows manifest to Eric that 







The small window is 
+ 1 stuck for good, Kato. 
-. -. 
Eric, would you open 
the windows? 
,,,. 
windows in this room has only 
one member, I used the singular 
..., • ' form, WINDOW. I used THE 
because I was referring to the 
unique member of the set. 




Eric, open the window. 
ABC##~ 
••••••• Even though there are 
two windows, I knew, 
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Even though there are two 
windows, I said, THE 
WINDOW because Eric and I 
have lived together for 
several months now, and 
when Kato said, 
1
,. _ ,, 
"Open ... ," he meant the 
big window because 
that's the only window 
we both know that we open \ we ever open. 
only the big window. 
Since the small window is not a member of 
the set we always open, the full set that I 
referred to had just one member - the big 
window. Since there was just one member, I 
used the singular form WINDOW. I used THE 
because the member was unique and manifest 
to Eric. 
Eric and I are no longer in our 
room; however, since Eric 
stories ABC ## [j] 
Yes, I'm glad the windows 
face west because I love 
California sunsets. 
referred to our room in his question, I could 
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then go on to talk about any unique items in .., _________ ,,, 
our room using THE. In my answer to Eric, I 
was referring to the full set of windows in 
our room that face west. Therefore, I said 
THE WINDOWS. 
stories ABC ## l e I 
• Eric opens a window 
• Kato and Eric find their way around campus 
• Kato and Eric work out 
•Kato and Eric in Japan 
• Quit THE ENGLISH ARTICLES 
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CHAPTER V 
OTHER DESIGN ASPECTS OF THE TUTORIAL 
I tried to learn articles, but it was impossible, 
so now I never use any! They are magic, and only 
Ameri~ans know magic trick. (Yasuhiro Misaki, 
personal corrununication, 1989). 
This student, Yasuhiro, earned a score of 550 on the 
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Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), a score high 
enough to earn him entrance to Stanford University's School 
of Business. The following prototype for a computerized 
tutorial was designed with Yasuhiro in mind as the typical 
user. The user would be intelligent, advanced in English, 
exasperated with the article system yet still curious about 
how it works. 
The tutorial consists of a series of short "stories" 
featuring two characters, Kato and Eric, who are roorrunates 
at UCLA. All uses of the articles are non-generic. The 
uses are contextualized in these stories in order to capture 
past shared knowledge, and shared recent discourse and 
experience of the two characters. The emphasis is not on 
forms (mass, singular, plural) but on what John Hawkins 
called "pragmatic sets" in the real world. These, along 
with uniqueness, and the conversational implicatures 
described in Hawkins' theory are explained every time a 
character uses an article. 
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Unlike most English textbooks, which tend to simplify 
explanations to suit students' readering level, this 
tutorial uses advanced English syntax and terminology in its 
explanations. This advanced level should not be an obstacle 
to any user since Japanese translations are available at any 
time through a command option. The sole focus of the 
tutorial is article usage, not readability. 
Wherever possible, "click objects" in the screen 
margins may alter the context of an utterance. When a user 
clicks an object, the change in context may cause a 
character to change his choice of article in the same 
sentence frame. This interactive aspect of the tutorial is 
crucial to showing how the articles are dependent on 
contexts wider than a sentence. 
STORY: "Kato and Eric Find Their Way Around UCLA" 
FRAME: Kato and Eric are leaving their dorm room. 
SMALL ERIC: "Let's go to the bookstore--I need to buy my 
Algebra II textbook." 
BIG ERIC: I said the bookstore because each university has 
a unique bookstore where students buy their textbooks. 
Since the P-set of my utterance is a linguistic community 
(the university campus), my use of the can refer 
unambiguously to the unique UCLA campus bookstore. [P-set = 
Linguistic Community; +manifest +unique; the induces 
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conventional implicature (there is a subset of entities, or 
bookstores, in the universe of discourse which is mutually 
manifest to speaker and hearer and within which the 
referent, bookstore, exists and is unique. The hearer should 
locate it)]. 
FRAME: Eric and Kato are walking across the campus. A 
stranger, who appears to be a student, is walking toward 
them. 
SMALL KATO: "Let's ask this student where the bookstore is." 
SMALL KATO: "Do you know where the bookstore is?" 
STUDENT: "You must mean the UCLA bookstore. No, I don't, 
but I know where a bookstore is; you could go there and ask 
for directions to the bookstore." 
BIG STUDENT: I said a bookstore because I meant not the 
unique UCLA textbook bookstore. Because I am on a campus, 
the definite article would be expected with the word 
bookstore. Since I have instead used a, my referent is 
unambiguously another bookstore, not the UCLA bookstore. [P-
set = Linguistic Community; Because the could have been 
used (the bookstore being +manifest and +unique), use of a 
Q-implicated (made the strongest statement consistent with a 
speaker's knowledge) not the since a and the are on a 
horn scale, <the, a>]. 
SMALL ERIC: "Thanks anyway. " 
FRAME: The stranger goes on his way as Eric and Kato 
approach a taco cart. 
SMALL ERIC: "Umrmn ... I need a burrito." 
BIG ERIC: I said a burrito because the P-set is the set of 
burritos on the cart. By using a when there are many 
burritos, I am implying one of the burritos. The could not 
have been used; therefore, since a P-set exists in which 
burrito could exist, use of a I-implicates (enriches to) 
one of the]. 
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[P-set = Irrunediate Situation; +manifest -unique; use of a I-
implicates (enriches to) one of the]. 
FRAME: Eric and Kato are walking along carrying their 
burritos. Across the street, a football field, comes into 
view. 
BIG ERIC: "Let's sit on the bleachers and watch the players 
practice." 
BIG ERIC: Bleachers is always plural, so I used the plural 
form, bleachers. I said the bleachers rather than some 
bleachers because I meant the unique group of bleachers 
within the immediate situation of my utterance, the 
bleachers before us, manifest to Kato, which we could sit 
on. [P-set = Immediate Situation; +the +manifest +unique; 
the induces conventional implicature, i.e., there is a 
subset of entities, or bleachers, in the universe of 
discourse which is mutually manifest to speaker and hearer 
and within which the referent, bleachers, exists and is 




ZERO-FORM 1. - 2. bleachers 
A/SOME-FORM 3. - 4. some bleachers 
THE-FORM 5. - 6. the bleachers 
CLICK ABC: 
2. Bleachers are uncomfortable. 
4. Some bleachers are steep. 
6. When we get to the stadium, let's climb to the top of the 
bleachers. 
CLICK OBJECT: DELIVERY VAN 
FRAME: A delivery van obstructs Kato's view of the football 
field and the bleachers across the street. 
SMALL KATO: "What bleachers?" 
FRAME: The delivery van moves out of the frame. 
SMALL KATO: "Oh, the bleachers over there." 
BIG KATO: I said, "What bleachers?" because Eric made a 
reference (the bleachers) that was not manifest to me--my 
view of the bleachers was obstructed by the van. [The P-set 
intended by the speaker (Immediate Situation) could not be 
correctly assessed by the hearer]. When the van moved away, 
I realized that Eric meant the bleachers that were visible, 
across the street. [P-set = Immediate Situation; +manifest 
+unique; the induces conventional implicature]. 
FRAME: Eric and Kato are again walking on the campus. 
SMALL ERIC: "I'm beginning to wonder if this school has a 
bookstore!" 
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BIG ERIC: I said a bookstore because the verbs have and be 
actually define the membership of the relevant objects 
within a pragmatic set. They assert what the definite 
article presupposes, that certain objects exist within a P-
set. In this case, the P-set is this school. Use of has 
asserts that bookstore is a unique member of this pragmatic 
set. 
FRAME: Up ahead, a sign says, "Pegasus Books." 
SMALL ERIC: "Look! A bookstore!" 
BIG ERIC: I said a bookstore because I was directly 
referring to NOT the unique campus bookstore. [P-set = 
Immediate Situation; +manifest +unique; the could be used; 
therefore, a Q-implicates not the]. 
SMALL KATO: "But it's the wrong one." 
CLICK OBJECT: BOOKSTORE 
SMALL ERIC: "Look! The bookstore!" 
BIG ERIC: I said the bookstore because I was directly 
referring to the unique campus bookstore. [P-set = 
Immediate Situation; +manifest +unique; the induces 
conventional implicature] . 
FRAME: The former Pegasus Bookstore is now called The UCLA 
Bookstore. 
FRAME: Eric and Kato are walking away from the bookstore. 
Kato is carrying an algebra book. 
SMALL ERIC: "Let's go to the library." 
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BIG ERIC: This reference, the library, is just like the 
bookstore. Campuses always have a library. Since I am on a 
campus, my use of the library refers unambiguously to the 
unique UCLA undergraduate library, not to the Los Angeles 
Public Library or some other library. [P-set = Linguistic 
Community; +manifest +unique; the induces conventional 
implicature] . 
FRAME: Kato and Eric are studying at a library table. 
SMALL KATO: "Kato, I'm going back to the room to get my 
biology book." 
BIG KATO: I said the room because the P-set is the set of 
rooms, known to my hearer, Eric, that contains my biology 
book. This set of rooms contains one mernber--our unique 
dormitory room. The only article possible is the. If I had 
said I am going back to a room to get my biology books, I 
would have been referring to not our dormitory room, and 
Eric would have wondered what room I was referring to. [P-
set = Linguistic Community; +manifest +unique; the induces 
conventional implicature] . 
SMALL KATO: "The syllabus of my math course is on my desk. 
I'll go with you." 
BIG KATO: I said the syllabus because the following 
genitive, of my math course, created an NP, the syllabus of 
my math course, that defined the P-set within which the 
referent was unique and manifest. [P-set = Defined by 
Modifier; +manifest +unique; the induces conventional 
implicature] . 
FRAME: Kato and Eric exiting the library. 
FRAME: Kato and Eric at the door of their room. 
SMALL ERIC: "Oh no, I think I left my keys on the 
bleachers." 
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BIG ERIC: I said the bleachers because Kato and I shared the 
experience earlier today of sitting on bleachers at the 
football field. By saying the bleachers I am unambiguously 
ref erring to that unique set of bleachers where I could have 
left my keys. [P-set = Previous Discourse; +manifest 
+unique; the induces conventional implicature]. 
FRAME: Eric running down the hallway. 
SMALL PASSERBY: "Where is he going?" 
SMALL KATO: "He left his keys on some bleachers." 
BIG KATO: I said some bleachers rather than the bleachers 
because this passerby does not know about the unique maximal 
set of bleachers where Eric has left his keys; some (the 
plural version of a) is the correct choice. [P-set = none 
for this hearer; -manifest -unique; some is not enriched to 
some of the ] . 
THE END 
STORY: "Kato Works Out" 
FRAME: A side view of Kato jogging on a treadmill. 
FRAME: Top view of the treadmill (Kata's view) from where we 
see a printed message at the head of the walking platform. 
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It reads,"This treadmill is designed to provide quiet, 
smooth operation for aggressive workouts. A powerful motor 
delivers efficient operation for serious exercise programs. 
The sturdy handrail is securely mounted to provide support 
on the wide, smooth walking surface. The user-friendly 
console permits continuous monitoring of electronic 
functions. An adjustable elevation mechanism adds 
versatility to any workout program." 
BIG KATO: The writer of this advertisement knew that to read 
it, the reader would have to stand so that some parts of the 
treadmill were visible and others were not. All of the 
parts mentioned with the would be unique and visible to the 
reader (they would be manifest); all the parts mentioned 
with a would be unique but hidden from the reader (they 
would not be manifest): [P-set = Immediate Situation; 
+manifest and + uniques = the handrail, the surface, the 
console; -manifest and +uniques = an elevation mechanism, a 
motor; all uses of the induce conventional implicature; all 
uses of a]. 
FRAME: We see the side view again. Now Eric has walked into 
the frame and is watching Kato. 
SMALL ERIC: "Kato, you should increase the speed." 
BIG ERIC: I used the speed because speed is unique in the 
immediate situation (of Kato's jogging on the treadmill). 
Other uniques in this situation are the elevation and the 
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distance. [P-set = Bridging; +manifest +unique; the I-
implicates the speed of the treadmill]. 
SMALL KATO: "No thanks, 4 mph is a good speed for me." 
BIG KATO: I used a good speed because the verbs have and be 
define the membership of the relevant objects within a 
pragmatic set. They assert what the definite article 
presupposes, that certain objects exist within a P-set. In 
this case, the P-set is the speeds that are good for me. 
Within that set, use of is asserts that 4 mph is a member. 
CLICK ##: 
SINGULAR PLURAL 
ZERO-FORM 1.speed 2. speeds 
A/SOME-FORM 3. a speed 4. some speeds 
THE-FORM 5. the speed 6. the speeds 
CLICK ABC: 
1. People today expect to travel with great speed. 
2. Speeds of over 90 mph are harmful to your car's 
engine. 
3. A walking speed of 3.5 mph is good for the heart. 
4. Some speeds make the parts of this motor vibrate. 
5. The distance to the moon is measured by the speed of 
light. 
6. Each year, Olympic runners break the 
speeds of previous runners. 
FRAME: Kato and Eric trade places: Eric jumps onto the 
treadmill and turns up the speed. A clock appears on the 
wall and quickly moves ten minutes. Now Eric is exhausted 
but still running. In the background is a stack of folded 
towels. 
SMALL ERIC: "Would you get me a towel." 
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BIG ERIC: The P-set contains all the towels in the stack in 
this room. I said a towel because a conversationally 
implicates one of the towels before us. [P-set = Immediate 
Situation; +manifest -unique; a I-implicates (enrich to) one 
of the]. 
CLICK OBJECT: TOWEL ON ATHLETIC BAG 
FRAME: The stack of towels remains, but there also appears a 
single towel atop an athletic bag. 
SMALL ERIC: Eric says, "Would you get me the towel?" 
BIG ERIC: I said the towel because I was referring to the 
towel that Kato could get for me that is unique--the towel 
on the athletic bag. 
CLICK OBJECT: TOWEL ON CHAIR 
FRAME: Now there is a stack of towels, a single towel on an 
athletic bag, and a towel on a hook on the wall. 
ERIC: "Would you get me the towel on the wall?" 
ERIC: The P-set is defined by the prepositional phrase on 
the wall. Since the towel in the P-set of towels on the 
wall is unique and manifest, I said the towel. If I had 
said "Get me the towel," Kato would not have known whether I 
meant the towel on the athletic bag or the towel on the 
wall. [P-set = Defined by Modifier; +manifest +unique; the 
induces conventional implicature] . 
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FRAME: Kato hands Eric a towel. Eric mops his face and 
drapes the towel over the railing. Kato exits the scene. 
Eric follows. 
KATO, OFF SCREEN: "Don't forget the towel." 
FRAME: An arm reaches back and grabs the towel. 
BIG KATO: The P-set (towels that should not be forgotten) 
contains one member, so I used the singular form, towel. I 
used the because this towel is manifest to Eric--he just 
touched it, spoke about, and saw it--and because it is 
unique. [P-set = Previous Discourse; +manifest +unique; the 
induces conventional implicature] . 
CLICK ##: 
SINGULAR PLURAL 
ZERO-FORM 1. - 2. towels 
A/SOME-FORM 3. a towel 4. some towels 
THE-FORM 5. the towel 6. the towels 
THE END 
STORY: "Kato and Eric Go Camping" 
FRAME: Twilight. Kato and Eric resting by a lake in the 
mountains. 
FRAME: Eric's backpack is open. A trail map sticks out of 
the top. 
SMALL KATO: "Could I see the trail map?" 
BIG KATO: I said the trail map because I was referring to 
the unique map immediately in front of us, in the immediate 
situation of the utterance. [P-set = Irmnediate Situation; 
+manifest +unique; the induces conventional implicature]. 
CLICK OBJECT: BACKPACK 
FRAME: Eric's backpack is now closed. 
SMALL KATO: "What's in your backpack?" 
SMALL ERIC: "I have a flashlight, a compass, a trail map, 
and some food." 
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BIG ERIC: I used a and some with these items because they 
were not manifest to Kato. Only manifest (and unique) items 
can take the. 
SMALL KATO: "Could I see the trail map?" 
BIG KATO: I said the trail map because the map was unique 
in Eric's pack (remember, Eric said a trail map not some 
trail maps) and because it was manifest to both of us, 
having been mentioned in the previous discourse when Eric 
said I have a trail map. [P-set = Previous Discourse; 
+manifest +unique; the induces conventional implicature]. 
FRAME: Eric hands Kato the trail map. 
SMALL KATO: "The trail that we are on now, ends at a 
lookout." 
BIG KATO: I said the trail because the relative clause that 
we are on now names the P-set (trails we are on now) within 
which our trail is unique and manifest. I said a lookout 
because the referent, lookout, was not manifest to Eric 
before my mention of it. [P-set = Defined by Modifier; 
+manifest +unique; the induces conventional implicature]. 
SMALL ERIC: "I hear an owl." 
BIG ERIC: I said an owl because I don't believe that Kato 
heard the owl. In other words, I don't believe it was 
manifest to Kato. 
CLICK OBJECT: OWL [sound of an owl] 
SMALL KATO: "The owl sounds close by." 
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BIG KATO: I said the owl because I guessed that Eric 
probably heard the owl sound I just heard. I guessed that 
the sound was manifest to Eric and I assumed (rightly or 
wrongly) that the sound came from the same (unique) owl as 
before. [P-set = Previous Discourse; +manifest +unique; the 
induces conventional implicature] . 
SMALL ERIC: "I wonder if the moon will be out tonight." 
BIG Eric: I said the moon because I was referring to the 
earth's unique moon. [P-set = Linguistic Cormnunity; 
+manifest +unique; the induces conventional implicature] . 
CLICK OBJECT: MOON 
FRAME: Darkness with full moon rising. 
SMALL KATO: "Look, there's a full moon tonight." 
BIG KATO: I said a full moon because a follows existential 
there. 
CLICK OBJECT: SUN 
FRAME: It is daybreak with pale moon sinking in the west. 
SMALL ERIC: "The moon is gone. " 
BIG ERIC: I said the moon because I was referring to the 
earth's unique moon. [P-set = Linguistic Community; 
+manifest +unique; the induces conventional irnplicature] . 
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SMALL KATO: "But look, there's the moon and the sun, too." 
BIG KATO: In this sentence there is used to "point to" the 
moon rather than to state the existence of the moon; 
therefore, so I used the [earth's unique] moon, not a moon. 
CLICK ##: 
SINGULAR PLURAL 
ZERO-FORM 1. - 2. moons 
A/SOME-FORM 3. a moon 4. some moons 
THE-FORM 5. the moon 6. the moons 
CLICK ABC: 
1. 
2. Moons that have halos predict rain. 
3. A full moon means more crime in the city. 
4. Some moons have smiling faces. 
5. The moon is rising. 
6. The moons I like best are fragile crescents. 
SMALL ERIC: "I hope I catch a trout today." 
BIG ERIC: I said a trout because the P-set is all the trout 
in the lake that I hope to catch. A conversationally 
implicates one of the. [P-set = Bridging; +manifest 
-unique; a I-implicates one of the]. 
SMALL KATO: "The trout I catch will be my breakfast." 
BIG KATO: I said the trout because the P-set is the 
particular trout in the lake that I will catch. It is a 
one-member, unique and manifest P-set. [P-set = Defined by 
Modifier; +manifest +unique; the induces conventional 
implicature] . 
FRAME: Eating their trout. 
SMALL ERIC: "There's nothing like a fresh trout for 
breakfast." 
BIG ERIC: A follows existential there. 
THE END 
STORY: "Kato and Eric in Japan" 
FRAME: Kato and Eric in a kimono shop. A clerk is showing 
them a kimono. 
SMALL SALESCLERK: "Would you like to see an obi for this 
kimono?" 
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BIG SALESCLERK: I said an obi because a wearer may choose 
any obi to go with a kimono. A kimono does not have a 
unique obi designed just for it. If there had been a unique 
obi just for that kimono, I would have said the obi. [P-set 
= Defined by Modifier; +manifest -unique; an I-implicates 
one of the obis]. 
FRAME: Kato and Eric leaving the shop with a package. 
SMALL KATO: "I really want to go to a snow festival." 
BIG KATO: I said a snow festival because I knew there were 
two--one at 0-dori Park and one at Makomanai. My use of a 
meant one of the. [P-set = Linguistic Community; +manifest 
-unique; a I-implicates one of the]. 
SMALL ERIC: "After the snow festival, let's pick up an 
English-language newspaper." 
BIG ERIC: I said an English-language newspaper because there 
are approximately four different English-language dailies to 
choose from. [P-set = linguistic community; +manifest 
-unique; a I-implicates one of the]. 
SMALL KATO: "When we return to Tokyo, let's stop in at the 
the JNTO (Japan National Tourist Organization) Center." 
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BIG KATO: I said the JNTO because, although there are 
several JNTO off ices in Japan, there is only one JNTO Center 
in Tokyo. Since this office is unique to the city of Tokyo, 
it is unique in its P-set. [P-set = city of Tokyo; +manifest 
+unique; the induces conventional implicature 
SMALL ERIC: "Yes, maybe the JNTO guides can tell us how to 
get to the Ibusuki jungle bath." 
BIG ERIC: I said the Ibusuki jungle bath because there is 
one such jungle bath in Ibusuki; therefore, it is unique in 
this modifier-defined P-set. [P-set = Defined by Modifier; 





Authors of the performance studies frequently mentioned 
the problem of being unable to determine, in cases where 
more than one article fit a sentence frame, whether the 
article chosen matched the student's intended referent or 
not. A similar problem may arise when students decode. 
When there seems to be more than one possibility, students 
may not know which entity an article is referring to because 
they do not know how the articles function, or what they 
"mean." The aforementioned tutorial addresses the decoding 
problem by exhaustively explaining the choices that English 
speakers make in given situations. It shows how speakers 
silently exploit mutually manifest, real-world situations, 
cordoned off as "P-sets, 11 to establish the uniqueness of 
entities. Once uniqueness is mentally established, they 
then use articles to induce implicatures and thereby refer 
unambiguously. 
The tutorial is designed to emphasize these pragmatic 
aspects of article usage. Whenever possible, contexts are 
manipulated to reflect the contrasting uses of the and a 
in the same sentence frame. A speaker's choice of article 
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is explained from the speaker's point of view as an actor's 
"aside", rather than from a third-party, or author's 
perspective. Traditional terms such as specific and 
definite, whose Japanese counterparts may connote different 
meanings, are avoided. And, since the target structure is 
just the articles rather than other vocabulary, a "command" 
option offers Japanese translation of all text. Mechanical 
aspects such as mass, singular, and plural forms are also 
handled as command options. The culture-bound aspect of the 
uniqueness of noun phrases is illustrated with examples 
situated in Japanese culture. 
Although the tutorial presents a variety of situational 
contexts for definite and indefinite reference, it is, as it 
stands, only a prototype. To have serious pedagogical 
value, the number of examples would need to be greatly 
increased. In addition, a complete tutorial would need an 
intensive section on premodified noun phrases, an area that 
is difficult for Japanese students (Iwasaki 1990) and one 
that has been almost universally neglected by textbooks. 
That section could be incorporated relatively easily, as it 
would likely resemble a traditional textbook drill. 
Since the tutorial emphasizes decoding, the question 
arises whether students could ever learn to encode, or 
actually produce articles on-line. The rate of speed used 
for speech would seem to make the feat impossible. Yet, as 
complicated as the articles are, students may still learn to 
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produce them on-line if they first learn to interpret the 
articles they hear in terms of uniqueness relative to 
mutually manifest P-sets and the implicatures that the 
articles induce. By using these tools, and by taking the 
time to reflect on sentences recently heard or seen, 
students may arrive at the correct interpretations. Once 
they learn to interpret correctly when they decode, they may 
eventually learn to encode correctly as well. 
In recent years, the field of TESOL has put forth 
research papers ending with "pedagogical implications," or 
advice on how to improve teaching materials based on 
findings. This project has been a response to those papers' 
recorrrrnendations and to the data of the performance studies 
which laid the groundwork for, what I hope, is an improved 
English article system for Japanese speakers. To the extent 
that the field of second-language learning adapts theories 
from other domains--psychology and linguistics--to the 
practical goal of teaching a second language, the field is 
an applied science. This project has undertaken to adapt 
recent discoveries in pragmatics to the practical problem of 
teaching article usage. Its efforts, as such, fall within 
the scope of second-language learning as an applied science. 
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"Indefinite Nouns. We use a/an to mean an indefinite one. 
It is not important to know exactly which one. I have a book. I 
need an eraser. 
Specific Nouns. We use the for specific things. Both the 
speaker and the listener know which one we are talking about. 
We know exactly which one for one of the following reasons: 
We share common experience, or there is only one in our 
experience. We identified the noun before. We specify 
exactly which one. 
We use the ... to talk about the group as a single unit. The 
hammer is a useful tool. We can usually use the 'zero article' 
and a plural noun, or a and a singular noun to express the 
same idea. In this case we are talking about all the members of 
the group or a typical member of the group. Hammers are 
useful tools. A hammer is a useful tool. However, the sounds 
more technical or scientific. 
Abstract Nouns. For an abstract or general idea, we use the 
'zero article' Do your friends give you advice? We can modify 
an abstract noun and make it specific. In this case we use the 
. Do you follow the advice of your friends?" 
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"Use the definite article the when a noun phrase ... makes a 
specific reference for your reader. The reader will know from 
information contained in the text what actual person, thing, or 
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a statement is clear to the sender and receiver of a 
message .... [example] the is used because the noun was 
referred to before ... Context: a noun can be definite because of 
the common understanding of the people involved in the 
communication. Because they are living or thinking about the 
same situation, they know what to expect there." 
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" Indefinite articles are used in front of nouns to show that 
the nouns are not identified. That is, the speaker and the 
listener are not thinking about exactly the same item. 
The definite article the is used in front of nouns to show that 
the nouns are identified. That is, both the speaker and the 
listener are thinking about exactly the same item .... Often, the 
first time that a noun is mentioned, it indefinite. But the second 
time ... it becomes definite .... When a noun is identified by other 
information in the same sentence, it is often definite ... " 
When a noun is used in an indefinite sense, it refers to an 
object or a concept, but not to a specific object or concept that 
is known to both speaker and the listener. When a noun is 
used in a definite sense, it refers to a specific object or 
concept that is known to both the speaker and the listener. 
Both the speaker and the listener know the identity of the 
noun ... [which] can be established in many ways ... a) previous 
mention ... b) a following identifying phrase ... Be careful! A 
phrase or clause that follows a noun does not always identify 
it...c) shared knowledQe ... 
[The's] use indicates that the speaker ... and listener share a 
definite knowledge about the noun referred to .... the noun has 
been qualified by a prepositional phrase or adjective clause; 
the noun has been previously specified; the noun refers to the 
class or thing in general; there is a superlative; the noun is one 








English Structure in Davis 1987 379 8 
Focus: Book One 
Newbury House 
Basic English Azar 1984 284 0 
Grammar 
Prentice-Hall 
Understanding Azar 1989 411 4 
and Using English 
Grammar Prentice-Hall 
Second Edition 
A Competency-Based Kirn, E. 1989 180 7 
Grammar 
Random House 
Developing Basic Eichler 1981 166 0 
Writing Skills in 
English as a Second University of 







'Wan =we don't know which one. 
Prepositional phrases make nouns specific .... Use the with 
specific people or things ... When there is only one person or 
thing (the earth ... ) use the .... The first time you say a noun, use 
a/an or no article. After the first time, use the." 
"We use the when both the speaker and the listener know 
which item is meant.. .. Study the use of the as you continue in 
this book. You will find some other ways of knowing 'which."' 
0 
"indefinite nouns are actual things (not symbols) but they are 
not specifically identified. In I ate a banana, the speaker is 
not referring to 'this banana' or 'that banana you gave me.' ... A 
noun is definite when both the speaker and the listener are 
thinking about the same specific thing. In thank you for the 
banana, the speaker uses the because the listener knows 
which specific banana the speaker is talking about. .. Use the 
for the second mention of an indefinite noun." 
"General statements usually contain nonspecific nouns. A 
noun is nonspecific if you can't answer the question 'Which 
one or ones?' Food contain calories. A calorie is a unit of 
energy. A specific noun can be identified in a previous 
sentence or in the same sentence. A noun is specific if you 
can answer the question 'Which one or ones?' I avoid ice 
cream because of the calories. (Which calories? The calories 
in the ice cream). A noun mentioned for the first time is 
nonspecific if there are more than one in the context. Do you 
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"The definite article is used: When the object or group of 
objects is unique ... the equator, the stars ..... Before a noun 
made definite by the addition of a phrase or clause .... Before a 
noun which by reason of locality can represent only one 
particular thing: Ann is in the garden ... . Before superlatives ... 
Alan is used: Before a singular noun which is countable 
when it is mentioned for the first time and represents no 
particular person or thing." 
0 
"The has specific uses with proper nouns, especially with 
geographical locations. Because proper nouns identify 
specific places, the is often used. There are few exceptions 
to the rules. Study the followinQ chart .... " 
"The definite article is used if the meaning of the noun is 
restricted to a particular example." Other directions are for 
occasional uses, e.g., "The is not used when discussing the 
general purpose of a buildinQ." 
"The occurs with names for familiar persons or objects in the 
home and the community. It is also used with names for 
natural objects in the world and in the universe. In these uses, 
the limits a noun to the one specimen we are familiar with or 
that we have in mind, although other specimens in the class 
may exist....Keep in mind that a refers to one unknown or 
unspecified person or thing, and that it is generally not used 
with noncountable noun." Other directions are for occasional 
uses, e.g., "the with 'ranking' adjectives; the with words 
referrinq to historical events, qovernment, etc." 
"THE. The article the appears ... when that noun is clearly 
identified. The identification may be clear from the speaker's 
physical environment. There is often only one of a certain 
object in the speaker's environment. The identification may be 
clear from information in a previous sentence. Use a/an .. .in 
front of a noun the first time that noun is mentioned. Use the 
to refer to the same noun later. The identification may be clear 
from information in the same sentence. 
NOUNS WITH NO ARTICLES. To make general statements 
about all members of a group, use a plural count noun or a non-
count noun with no article." f-1 
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"We use a/an when the listener doesn't know which thing we 
mean. We use the when it is clear which thing we mean. Tom 
sat down on a chair (we don't know which chair). Tom sat down 
on the chair nearest the door (we know which chair). [also, 
first mention takes a/an/." 
0 
" A non-specific noun has no identification yet. The 
speaker ... or listener. .. doesn't know anything about it yet. At 
the first mention of a noun, it is usually non-specific. 
A specific noun has identification. Both speaker ... and 
listener ... already know something about it: 1. Sometimes a 
gesture identifies a noun. 2. Sometimes the identification is in 
the previous sentence. 3. Sometimes the identification is in 
the same sentence. 4. Sometimes a noun needs no 
identification because it is specific from the context. 5. 
Sometimes a noun needs no identification because there is 
only one of that noun in the context." 
"Use ... a/an ... when the noun is introduced or identified for the 
first time .... Use ... the ... when both listener and speaker know 
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"Alan is followed by a non-specific noun (The noun is one of 
many) ... [and is] used to introduce a noun phrase ... The is 
followed by a specific noun (the noun is known to the listener or 
reader) .... [The is] used when the noun phrase has already 
been mentioned." 
"The is used when the listener knows what specific thing or 
person the speaker is talking about. The speaker is thinking 
"you know what I mean" when he or she use the. The speaker 
thinks that the listener knows what she or he means in different 
situations: when the noun has already been 
mentioned=second mention ... when a related noun has already 
been mentioned=related second mention. We also use the 
definite article the when the noun is unique ... the place where 
you are speaking makes it clear ... there's only one of the thing 
mentioned ... a/an is used when the speaker first mentions a 
thing or person." 
"The most common use of the indefinite article .. .is to signal 
an unspecified item ... He wants a bicycle. Note that there is no 
attempt to make the noun specific. The noun is indefinite. 
The definite article the signals a specific or particular 
person, place or thing. Nouns can be mad~ specific in several 
ways: 1 ) ... when the noun is first mentioned, it is unspecified, 
so the article a is used. 2) The noun has a modifying phrase 
or clause ... that identifies it as a specific item. 3) The situation 
identifies the noun. When both writer and reader are familiar 
with the item that is being referred to, the is used. Often there 
is only one such item. 4)The noun is specific because it is 
unique. 5)The use of superlatives, ranking adjectives, and 
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2.5 "The word the points out a definite person, place or thing or 
idea, or one that has been mentioned before .... Use the when 
the listener or reader already knows which things you mean, or 
when there is only one possible item you are speaking about. 
Use the with things that are the only ones of their kind. (There 
may be others in the same class of things, but we don't usually 
think about them) ... Use the definite article, the, when you want 
to point something out and make it definite ... Use the indefinite 
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